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China's and India's Differing Investment Treaty and
Dispute Settlement Experiences and Implications for
Africa
Won Kidane*
This Article examines China's and India's differing investment reaty
and dispute settlement experiences and the resulting implications for
Africa. It attempts to answer the question of whether there is evidence of
China's and India's attempt to take advantage of the default structural
imbalance enabled by centuries of international investment laws and
institutions that favor the investor. The Article begins by presenting the
background of the current economic reality and trends that necessitate
the evaluation of the existing rules and institutions. It then presents a
detailed assessment of this phenomenon by focusing on the investment
cases brought against India for context, followed by a critical appraisal
ofIndia's reaction to the perceived deficiencies of the existing system as
evidenced by its new BIT Model Text and the text's implications for
Africa. Next, the Article evaluates the most important body of evidence
that comes in the form of bilateral investment reaties, i.e., China's and
India's investment treaties with African states. Finally, it offers a
summary of conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION
The story of mankind over the last 500 years, as historian Philip Snow
aptly describes, "has been in very large measure the story of the response
of Asia and Africa to the alien culture of Europe and, lately, the United
States."I In the middle of the last decade, progressing this narrative
further, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times characterized the economic
rise of China and India as "the most important story of our age. It heralds
the end, in the not too distant future, of as much as five centuries of
1. PHILIP SNow, THE STAR RAFT, CHINA'S ENCOUNTER WITH AFRICA Xiii (Cornell Univ.
Press, 1988).
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domination by the Europeans and their colonial offshoots."2 Other
scholars have suggested that "[t]he WTO [World Trade Organization]
deadlock demonstrates that the conventional wisdom is changing, namely
that the powerful developed countries, leaving aside the differences
among themselves, can no longer easily impose their common will upon
developing countries."3
As the centuries' old economic and power hierarchy gradually showed
notable variability and the flow of investment increasingly defied
traditional patterns, it raised the question of whether such variability and
change set in motion a shift in the normative milieus. The economic shift
is empirically demonstrable,4 but the shift in the ground rules and the
implications for contemporary world economic order requires a
systematic investigation.5
Among other matters, this scrutiny must answer the question of
2. Muthucumarswamy Somarajah & Jiangy Wang, Introduction and Overview, in CHINA,
INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER I (Muthucumarswamy Sornarajah & Jiangy
Wang eds., 2010) (citing Martin Wolf, Asia's Giants Take Different Routes, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2005), https://www.ft.com/content/1caa807a-8510-11 d9-al72-00000e251 Ic8?mhq5j=e5).
3. Id. at 3.
4. See GDP Long-Term Forecast, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gdp-long-term-
forecast.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2018) (the share of China and India is also predicted to make a
significant increase, with China's GDP already leading the pack, and India's GDP expected to
exceed that of the fifteen-country eurozone and the United States by approximately 2050). The
OECD Economics Department has also reported:
Persistent growth differentials between OECD and emerging non-OECD economies will
lead to a major shift of economic balance towards the non-OECD area, particularly to
Asian and African economies. As a result, by 2060 the share of non-OECD countries in
world GDP will significantly exceed that of the current OECD members.
OECD ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, SHIFTING GEARS: POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT 50
YEARS, POLICY NOTE NO. 243 (July 2014), http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Shifting%20gear.pdf.
See also id. at 4 ("Economic interdependency among non-member economies and between OECD
and non-OECD countries is likely to increase. By 2060, about 50% of world trade will take place
among current non-OECD economies, up from 25% today.").
5. Five years ago, voices critical of the investment regime became more vocal and States begin
to reform their model investment agreements. Today, people march in the streets against
"private investment courts" and sign petitions against rade agreements with investment
protection chapters. The defenders of the status quo first ignored the protest, then belittled it,
and now claim that the protesters are missing the point. At the heights of a heated public
debate about the future of international investment law, academia should provide room for
an honest, conservative, but also fact-based reflection and exchange of ideas.
Preface to SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: MORE BALANCED, LESS
ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED (Steffen Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016
[hereinafter SHIFTING PARADIGMS]. Many of the chapters included in this book offer timely
perspectives on the shifting paradigm. For example, Gus Van Harten's contribution critiques the
European Commission's and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's
("UNCTAD") reform agendas of the investor-state arbitration system of the beginning of this
decade as insufficient to ensure independence, openness, and fairness. Gus Van Harten, The
European Commission and UNCTAD Reform Agendas: Do They Ensure Independence, Openness,
and Fairness in Investor-State Arbitration?, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS, supra, at 128-41.
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whether the international investment rules and institutions historically
designed to govern North-South6 relations7 are adaptable to South-South
relations.8 An important part of this inquiry pertains to whether existing
rules and institutions could serve the investment relations of China and
India with Africa in any meaningful way. The old investment rules and
institutions are a reflection of power relationships. Considering this, a
subcategory of the question more specifically asks whether there is
evidence of China's and India's desire and effort to systematically
maintain the structural advantages that such rules and institutions
fortuitously bestow onto them as their investors "go abroad" and compete
with or even replace Africa's traditional investors from the North.
Understandably, for reasons of Africa's unfavorable historical
experience and subordinate economic and political relationship with the
Western world, the Asian giants' (China and India) relationship with
Africa is being observed with a considerable degree of curiosity, and even
suspicion. The theoretical pillar of this suspicion is found in the school of
thought that implicitly admits that the evolution of the West's historic
relationship with Africa is a natural one. This school deems it necessary
6. In development discourses, the terms "North" and "South" are typically used to signify the
level of development of countries. All African countries, China, and India ordinarily fall under the
South category. See, e.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION-AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT
PARTNERSHIP 24-25 (June 18, 2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica20l0_en.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT] (discussing the terms
generally and focusing on "southern" or developing countries working collaboratively to overcome
obstacles in modernization/development).
7. It is sometimes argued that the rules protecting foreign investment were developed
specifically to constrain poor countries. That is simply wrong. It is certainly true that LDCs
[Least Developed Countries] played no role in developing the traditional rules and were, in
fact, constrained by them. But the rules were developed and applied first within Europe,
where they were widely accepted. Only later were they extended to Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.
CHARLES LIPsoN, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 12 (Univ. of California Press 1985). Once they were exported to Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, however, they changed their character from reciprocity to one-sided
protection of Northern capital in the South. See, e.g., Kate Miles, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDS OF CAPITAL 21 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2013) (arguing that such extension moved from "a base of reciprocity, to one of
imposition"). The normative regime has since been evolving in that direction. No attempt is made
to document the evolution here, as that task has been undertaken by this author in a forthcoming
article.
8. The existing international law at the end of World War Il -what one might call the "ancien
regime" - failed to adequately protect the foreign investments of their [capital exporting]
nationals from injurious actions by host country governments. The need for such protection
was heightened by the prospect of post-War economic expansion and the decolonization of
territories that had previously been under the control of the capital-exporting states.
Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 436-
37 (2010) (emphasis added).
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that the Asian giants attempt to replicate this "natural" state of affairs.9
Framed in investment law terms, the question asks whether China and
India, collectively or individually, would attempt to take advantage of
what some critics call "the law of greed"10 because of their "investor"
status vis-A-vis Africa. International investment law in its current
formulation is criticized as the law of greed "because of the fact that it is
built on accentuating only one side of the picture of foreign investment
so as to benefit the interests of the multinational corporations which exist
to seek profits for their shareholders."I I
At the theoretical level, this Article investigates whether there is
evidence of this school of thought underpinning China's and India's
individual and collective contemporary relations with Africa. In
economic terms, Africa still measurably lags behind both China and
India.12 It will continue to be a junior economic partner to the Asian
giants for the foreseeable future, as it had been vis-d-vis the developed
9. See, e.g., Mackson Woshamunu, Clinton warns against "new colonialism" in Africa,
REUTERS (June 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-clinton-africa-
idUSTRE75AORI20110611 ("Africa must beware of new colonialism as China expands ties there
and focus instead on partners able to help build productive capacity on the continent, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton said.") (internal quotations omitted).
10. M. Sornarajah is credited for this label. See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Avidan Kent,
Promoting Sustainable Investment hrough International Law, in SUSTAfNABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
WORLD INVESTMENT LAw 771, 772 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., Kluwer Law
International 2011) (quoting M. Sornarajah, A Law for Need or a Law for Greed?: Restoring the
Lost Law in the International Law of Foreign Investment, 123 INT'L ENVIRON. AGREEM ENTS 329,
331 (2006) (critiquing the lack of transparency in international law that grants little, if any, standing
to public interest representatives, or attention to public policy goals)).
11. Id. at 772. A comparative look at the number of investment cases brought against states
since the establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
offers evidence of this imbalance. For example, while India has been named as a respondent state
in at least twenty cases with only two of its corporations initiating arbitration against a host state,
the United Kingdom has been named a respondent only once, although its companies have initiated
arbitration against other states in at least sixty-four cases. Compare Investment Policy Hub, United
Kingdom - as Home State, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/2217partyRole=l (last visited Oct. 17,
2017) (detailing the number of cases on the UNCTAD Investment Hub Website for UK), with
Investment Policy Hub, India - as Respondent State, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2 (last visited Oct. 20,
2017) (reporting the number of cases for India). The statistics for the United States are equally
interesting. While American companies have initiated arbitral proceedings in at least 145 cases, the
United States has only been named as a respondent state in sixteen cases. Investment Policy Hub,
United States of America - as Home State, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/223?partyRole= 1 (last visited Oct. 20,
2017).
12. One such indicator is the latest World Bank data on Gross Domestic Product ("GDP").
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELEOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE (Apr. 17, 2017),
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (showing China ranking second with a
GDP of approximately USD $11 trillion and India ranking seventh with a GDP of approximately
USD $2 trillion).
2017] 409
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Western world for much of its history. The perennial practical question
that this Article seeks to answer is thus: Will the rules of the game
continue to reflect the power imbalance? Or will the complicated
contemporary world order produce a more balanced and equitable
framework to manage contemporary economic relations and support
sustainable development for all? Stated differently, this Article attempts
to answer the question of whether there is evidence of China's and India's
attempt to take advantage of the default structural imbalance enabled by
centuries of international investment laws and institutions that favor the
investor.
To answer these fundamental questions, this Article proceeds in five
parts. Part I presents the background of the current economic reality and
trends that necessitate the evaluation of the existing rules and institutions.
The evidence of China's and India's approach toward Africa can only be
accurately evaluated in light of the evolution and status of their own
relationships with the Western World (North-South relations). Part II
presents a detailed assessment of this phenomenon by focusing on the
investment cases brought against India1 3 for context, followed by Part III,
which critically appraises India's over-reaction to the perceived
deficiencies of the existing system as evidenced by its new BIT Model
Text and the text's implications for Africa. Part IV evaluates the most
important body of evidence that comes in the form of investment treaties,
i.e., China's and India's investment treaties with African states. Part V
offers a summary of conclusions.
I. CHINA, INDIA, AND AFRICA: THE POLITICAL RHETORIC, THE ECONOMIC
REALITY, AND THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Although the legal infrastructure designed to order the economic
relations of the developing nations of the South with the developed world
of the North has gradually evolved from outright imposition,14 to
13. This Article focuses more on India than China because India has more investor-state cases
and recently adopted a new BIT Model Text. Other writings by this author have previously focused
on China. See, e.g., WON KIDANE, CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE LAW, ECONOMICS
AND CULTURE OF ARBITRATION (Kluwer Law Int'l ed., 2011) [hereinafter KIDANE, CHINA-
AFRICA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT] (explaining the nature and magnitude of increasing China-Africa
economic relations in recent years); Won Kidane, China's Bilateral Investment Treaties with
African States in Comparative Context, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 142-69 (2016) [hereinafter
Kidane, China's Bilateral Investment Treaties] (discussing the primary legal instruments that
govern China-Africa investment relations, bilateral investment treaties ("BIT"), in light of a 2014
China-Canada BIT).
14. See, e.g., Louis T. Wells, Preface to THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS xv, xvi (Jose E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds.,
2011) (suggesting that in the past, powerful nations occasionally used military actions and other
forms of coercion to protect the economic interests of their investors aboard).
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involuntary acquiescence,15 to voluntary association,16 neither the
original design nor the evolution contemplated robust contemporary
South-South economic relations.17 To the extent the existing normative
regime governs South-South relations, it does so, in large measure, by
pure accident of history.18 This accident of history is, however, not value-
neutral, as its structure is inherently hierarchical, favoring those on the
top of the economic hierarchy regardless of their identity.
South-South economic relations also have hierarchy.19 A good
example of this is Africa's relationship with China and India. This
Section defines this economic hierarchy to set the stage for the evaluation
of the legal regime that governs Africa's economic relations with China
and India in subsequent sections.
15. See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 536-37 (2d ed.
2008) (noting how in the 1960s decolonization of Asia and Africa necessitated a more legitimate
means of resolution of disputes and how the World Bank proposed the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") as a means of resolving investor-state disputes). The
history of ICSID is well documented and it shows the concerns of the former colonies and how
they gradually accepted the mechanism with some suspicion. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 306-13 (1968) (showing as
an example the concerns of the Latin American countries during consultations with the World
Bank).
16. See Salacuse, supra note 8, at 436-37 (noting that post WWII economic expansion and
decolonization required the reformulation of the old regime). Professor Peter Muchlinski has also
written:
First generation agreements, with their emphasis on investor rights and host state
obligations, are said to be past their best and should give way to new agreements that
seek to balance investor rights and duties, preserve the State's right to regulate in the
public interest and to acknowledge the importance of not only economic but also social
and environmental goals in their design.
Peter Muchlinski, Negotiating New Generation International Investment Agreements: New
Sustainable Development Orientated Initiatives, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS, supra note 5, at 41-64.
17. See Joost Pauwelyn, Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of
International Investment Law, in ZACHARY DOUGLAS, JOOST PAUWELYN, AND JORGE E.
VINUALES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRfNGING THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 15 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (emphasizing the incremental and accidental nature of the
evolution).
18. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 536-37 (noting that it is principally "the wave of
decolonization in Africa and parts of Asia" and the associated take-overs of investments of former
colonial powers that necessitated the involvement of the World Bank and its establishment of
ICSID).
19. The economic progress of the last two decades in China, India, and Africa has created
complex economies that can no longer be adequately regulated through traditional and informal
means. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development in China andIndia, in CHINA, INDIA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 2, at 491-92 [hereinafter Peerenboom,
Law and Development] (suggesting that although laws and a functional legal system are necessary
to allow economic development, hese systems are not the only institutional pillars that are required
to drive growth).
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A. Political Rhetoric
Unlike Africa's relationship with the West, historically, both in reality
and by perception, Africa's relationship with China and India could be
described as egalitarian or horizontal because of the absence of a vertical
colonial relationship. Preoccupied with their own colonial and quasi-
colonial struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, until the
beginning of the post-colonial era, China and India never had a
meaningful opportunity to freely and fully interact with each other and
Africa for mutual benefit. The commencement of the contemporary
economic relationship hence required a political explication of why it
took this long for them to freely trade.20 Neither China nor India has had
any difficulty formulating its own political narrative that unifies each
with Africa, building on a common historical trauma that each suffered
and overcame. Both China and India present the narrative with a touch of
cultural distinctiveness. For example, during the first China-Africa
summit in China in 2000, President Jiang Zemin of the Peoples Republic
of China presented it this way:
The 20th century has witnessed earth-shaking changes in both China
and Africa. The Chinese and African peoples once fought courageously
for their national independence and freedom. They have since made
strenuous efforts for peace and development. They have scored
remarkable achievements and made historical progress in building up
their countries. During the Second World War, the Chinese people and
the African people fought an anti-Fascist war bravely on their respective
fronts and contributed tremendously to the final victory of the war.
Having smashed the shackles of the colonial rule that lasted for several
centuries, the African people won their national liberation and
independence. They have since registered gratifying progress in social
and economic development. The Chinese people did away with
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, known as the "three
big mountains" weighing down on the backs of the Chinese people.2 1
20. See, e.g., SNOW, supra note 1, at xiv ("Any Asian interest in Africa, any African sympathy
with Asia has been seen as constituting an implicit threat to the West's supremacy. This unease had
its origin in the colonial times. European settlers tended to think of Africa as their exclusive
preserve.").
21. Jiang Zemin, President, People's Republic of China, Address at the Opening Ceremony of
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Ministerial Conference: China nd Africa-Usher in the
New Century Together (Oct. 10, 2000),
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/SP12009/t606804.htm. This section continues:
And founded the People's Republic of China where the people become the masters of
the country. They have finally found a development path of building socialism with
Chinese characteristics and have been marching along this path confidently. We have
come to the conclusion after a review of the history of the past one hundred years that
the Chinese people and the African people both treasure independence, love peace and
long for development and that they are both important forces for world peace and
412 [Vol. 49
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Similarly, during the 2015 India-Africa summit, Indian Prime Minister
Narenda Modi put it in the following manner:
A very warm embrace of welcome and friendship from India. Today, it
is not just a meeting of India and Africa. Today, the dreams of one-third
of humanity have come together under one roof. Today, the heartbeat
of 1.25 billion Indians and 1.25 billion Africans are in rhythm. We are
among the world's oldest civilisations [sic]. We are each a vibrant
mosaic of languages, religions[,] and cultures. Our histories have
intersected since ages. Once united by geography, we are now linked
by the Indian Ocean. The currents of the mighty ocean have nurtured
the ties of kinship, commerce, and culture through centuries.22
Both China and India emphasize the unequal status that they had
endured in the last centuries and promise to usher in a more collaborative,
respectful, and mutually beneficial future. They have created platforms
of collaboration and dialogue. China's principal platform is the Forum
for China Africa Cooperation ("FOCAC") 23 and India's principal
platform is India-Africa Summit Forum ("IASF").24
B. Economic Reality
i. China's Contemporary Economic Relations with Africa
China's investment footprint in Africa is difficult to accurately
quantify, but there is no doubt that it is a game-changer. David Dollar, in
his 2016 Brookings Institution research paper, writes:
China's investment in Africa is big relative to its investments
elsewhere. The world as a whole has six times as much direct
common development. It is the unremitting efforts made by the people throughout the
world, including the Chinese and African peoples, that forces for world peace have kept
growing and the world development cause has made considerable progress. Id.
22. See India-Africa summit: Read full text of PM Narendra Modi's speech, TIMES OF INDIA
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Africa-summit-Read-full-text-of-
PM-Narendra-Modis-speech/articleshow/49577890.cms (providing a transcript of Indian Prime
Minister Narenda Modi's statements at the Inaugural Ceremony of the Third India-Africa Forum
Summit). The rest of the paragraph reads:
Generations of Indians and Africans have travelled to each other's land in search of their
destiny or by the force of circumstances. Either way, we have enriched each other and
strengthened our ties. We have lived in the long shadow of colonialism. And, we have
fought for our liberty and our dignity. We have struggled for opportunity, and also for
justice, which, the African wisdom describes, is the prime condition of humanity. We
have spoken in one voice in the world; and, we have formed a partnership for prosperity
among ourselves." Id.
23. See FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICAN COOPERATION, http://www.focac.org/eng/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2017) (providing documents and comprehensive information about FOCAC).
24. See INDIA-AFRICA FORUM SUMMIT, REINVIGORATED PARTNERSHIP - SHARED VISION,
(Oct. 26-29, 2015), http://mea.gov.in/india-africa-forum-summit-2015/index.html (offering
information about he latest summit and beyond).
2017] 413
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
investment in the United States as in Africa, reflecting the fact that most
FDI [foreign direct investment] goes to advanced economies. China's
pattern of investment has been different. As of end-2014, China had
about as much ODI [outward direct investment] in Africa (USD $32
billion) as in the United States (USD $38 billion). So, China's relative
focus on Africa is large. . . .25
Although Dollar's paper is interesting for its comparison of Chinese
investment in the United States and Africa, it appears to grossly
underestimate the volume of investment. There are several reasons for the
lack of accurate statistics on Chinese investment in Africa. The China-
Africa Research Initiative ("CARI") of the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies has done a useful analysis of
the existing data pertaining to Chinese investment in Africa. Its data puts
the total Chinese investment between 2003 and 2014 at approximately
USD $124 billion.26 CARI admits that it is almost impossible to know
exactly how much China invested in Africa because the official figureS2 7
tend to ignore Chinese investment made from offshore locations, which
is a very common way of channeling investment.2 8 As such, CARI's
spreadsheet appears to be a conservative estimate. For example, the
American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation's China
Global Investment Tracker puts China's total investment in Sub-Saharan
Africa alone at USD $241.75 billion and the Middle East and North
Africa's investment at USD $126.6 billion. 29 By comparison, out of a
25. DAVID DOLLAR, CHINA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA: FROM NATURAL RESOURCES TO
HUMAN RESOURCES 34 (Brookings Institution ed., 2016).
26. See DATA: CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INT'L STUDIES: CHINA AFRICA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (CARI), http://www.sais-cari.org/data-
chinese-and-american-fdi-to-africa (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter DATA: CHINESE
INVESTMENT IN AFRICA] (providing an excel spreadsheet breaking down China-Africa FDI data
from 2003-2015 by country).
27. See, e.g., Xi Jinping, President, People's Republic of China, Address at the China-Africa
Business Forum in Johannesburg: Working Together to Write a New Chapter In China-Africa
Cooperation (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhysl/zyjh/ (noting President
Jinping put the total amount of Chinese investment in Africa at USD $101 billion as of 2014. He
also said that there were 3,100 Chinese companies doing business in Africa. He puts the volume of
trade as of 2014 at USD $221.9 billion).
28. CARI has also reported:
But the numbers are understated because they don't include Chinese money that is
parked in an offshore financial center (British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, even
Hong Kong), they don't capture smaller investors, and they don't record acquisitions
that include African assets, but that took place in another jurisdiction (i.e. the purchase
of Addax at over $7 billion: Addax has several African properties, and properties in Iraq,
but the investment appears as Switzerland which is where Addax was domiciled.
DATA: CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 26 (internal quotations omitted).
29. CHINA GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRACKER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST.,
https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
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total of USD $1.3 trillion of outward investment, China's investment in
the United States and Europe is USD $134.36 billion and USD $202.96
billion respectively.30 In addition to this, CARI estimates that China has
loaned approximately USD $86 billion to African states during the same
time period (2001 to 2014).31
Chinese money in Africa finances projects from railways,32 to
powerplant transmissions,33 to ports34 and hospitals.35 Apart from the
quantity of work, a recent study by a researcher affiliated with the Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies concluded
that the quality of Chinese firms' work in Africa is similar to the quality
of work done by contractors from Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") countries.36 Finally, as to
forecasts, a 2015 report by Baker and McKenzie projects that China will
invest up to USD $1 trillion in Africa in the next decade or so.37
30. See id. (providing information regarding the United States and Europe).
31. DATA: CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 26.
32. See Agence France-Presse, Next stop the Red Sea: Ethiopia opens Chinese-built railway to
Djibouti, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/06/next-
stop-the-red-sea-ethiopia-opens-chinese-built-railway-to-djibouti ("The new $3.4bn railway, with
its red, yellow and green trains evoking the Ethiopian flag, was 70% financed by China's Exim
Bank and built by China Railway Group and China Civil Engineering Construction.").
33. As once reported:
A new International Energy Agency report shows that Chinese companies are leading
the way in the electrification of sub-Saharan Africa... . A substantial proportion of
Chinese power projects in sub- Saharan Africa are aimed at expanding access to
electricity. Over the period 2010 to 2020, a total of 120 million people will gain access
to electricity through the power grid, enabled by grid development and increasing power
generation capacity, of which Chinese contractors are responsible for 30%. Expanded
access to electricity can in turn facilitate industrialization and economic development.
China also supports rural off-grid solutions with solar energy kits donated in countries
like Rwanda and Comoros.
The Chinese in Africa-An Electrifying Story, MODERN POWER SYSTEMS (Aug. 29, 2016),
http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featurethe-chinese-in-africa-an-electrifying-story-
4991516/.
34. See David Smith, China Denies Building Empire in Africa, THEGUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/12/china-denies-building-empire-
africa-colonialism (reporting that Chinese firms are carrying out a USD $653 million (f430 million)
expansion of the main airport in Nairobi, Kenya).
35. See, e.g., Africa: China to Build 100 Hospitals, Clinics in Africa, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201510070976.html (reporting that the Chinese government has offered
to build one hundred hospitals and clinics across Africa to improve the existing health system and
position the country to be better able to respond to future disease outbreaks).
36. Jamie Farrell, How Do Chinese Contractors Perform in Africa? Evidence from World Bank
Projects 1-3 (SAIS China Africa Research Initiative, Working Paper No. 3, Feb. 2016),
http://staticl.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/573c970bf8baf3591b05253f/
1463588620386/Working+PaperJamie+Farrell.pdf
37. A report from The Economist stated:
The role of Asia-based DFIs looms large. Although they did not provide official numbers
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ii. Indian Investment in Africa
Indian investment in Africa is also significant, although, just like
China's, the volume is difficult to measure. According to a 2013 joint
study by the Confederation of Indian Industry ("CII") and the World
Trade Organization ("WIG"), trade between Africa and India grew from
USD $5.3 billion in 2001 to USD $63 billion in 2011, surpassing India's
trade with the United States, and is projected to reach USD $176 billion
in 2016.38 Indian investment in Africa is also difficult to measure, but the
CII-WTO study estimates that it grew from USD $9.2 billion in 2008-09
to USD $14.1 billion in 2011; however, the study also cites to other
sources that put the total amount at approximately USD $32 billion in
both Greenfield and Brownfield investments-mainly in
telecommunications, energy, computer services, power, and automobiles
sectors.39 A table summarizing some of the big-ticket investments in
recent years shows Indian companies' acquisition of African interests in
energy for USD $2 billion, telecom for USD $450 million, metal and ores
for USD $750 billion, and chemicals and fertilizers for USD $290
million.40
The real figures are likely to be much higher, not only because no one
seems to be keeping systematic records, but also because some of India's
investments in Africa are channeled through Mauritius, as are African
investments in India, because of favorable tax treaties. Indeed, the
Mauritian factor seems to skew all India-Africa investment statistics. The
CII-WTO report shows that Mauritian companies invest USD $64.17
billion in India, which makes African investment in India greater than
for this report, China-based DFIs, in particular, are estimated to be the largest single
source of funding, contributing over USD $13.4bn in Africa in 2013 alone, according to
the ICA. Chinese support for Africa based infrastructure has been weighted towards
industries in the transportation sector: rail, roads, airports and seaports. However, China-
based DFIs are also funding beneficiation and production platforms, such as commodity-
processing and manufacturing facilities in African countries. The role and influence of
China-based DFIs in Africa are likely to increase. China-based DFIs and policy banks,
such as China Exim, have committed to as much as USD $1 tn over the next decade or
so, in support of Africa-based investments of Chinese companies and the foreign-policy
objectives of the Chinese government.
THE ECONOMIST CORPORATE NETWORK, SPANNING AFRICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE GAP: How
DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL IS TRANSFORMING AFRICA'S PROJECT BUILD-OUT (Nov. 2015),
http://ftpOI.economist.com.hk/ECNjapers/Infrastructure-Africa.
38. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) & CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY,
INDIA-AFRICA: SOUTH-SOUTH: TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT 15 (2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/devele/a4t e/global reviewl 3proge/indiaafrica report.p
df (stressing that although no such systematic study was conducted in 2016, the forecast appears
correct as the assumed rate of growth did materialize).
39. Id. at 49.
40. See id. at 50, tbl.27 (detailing Indian investments in Africa made in years prior to 2011).
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Indian investment in Africa. The reality is, however, that such investment
includes investment routed from advanced economies of the North,
including the United States, through Mauritius.41 In any case, the
occasional smaller investments are not included in major studies. News
reports regularly carry stories such as the following:
The Tata Group, an India-based multinational conglomerate, earlier
this year unveiled a USD $1.7 billion Greenfield investment aimed at
boosting automobile and hospitality businesses in the African continent.
Furthermore, Vedanta Resources, India's largest mining and non-ferrous
metals company, recently reported that it had invested USD $4 billion
over the past nine years in Africa's mining sector.
In 2010, India's largest cellular service provider, Bharti Airtel, made a
foray into the African telecommunications market by acquiring Zain
Telecom's operations in fifteen countries. The company recently
unveiled plans to take over Warid Telecom Uganda, thus strengthening
its footprint in the continent.42
C. Legal Infrastructure
The economic progress of the last decade in China, India, and Africa
created complex and interdependent economies that could no longer be
adequately regulated through the exchange of diplomatic notes or
traditional and informal norms. As Randell Peerenboom notes:
41. The WTO report further found:
Mauritius is the largest investor in India with total FDI inflows of USD $64.17 billion
[and] accounts for [approximately] 40% of total FDI inflows to India. Some estimates
suggest that over 50% of US companies route their investments to India through
Mauritius, taking advantage of an exemption in [the] capital gains clause.
Id. at 30. See also Alioune Ndiaye, India's Investment in Africa: Feeding Up an Ambitious
Elephant, INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Sept. 15, 2016),
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/indiaE2%80%99s-investment-in-afica-
feeding-up-an-ambitious-elephant:
As of 2013, Africa accounted for 16 percent of India's foreign direct investment (FDI)
stock for a total of US$13.6 billion. Surprisingly enough, Africa's FDI stock in India is
five times higher, amounting to US$ 65.4 billion in the same year, which represents 26
percent of the country's total inward FDI stock. One should mention, however, that a
large part of this FDI is done through Mauritius. The double taxation avoidance
agreement (DTAA) signed between India and Mauritius makes it very attractive for
investors to funnel their investment through the island. Outward Indian FDI into Africa
follows the same logic.. . . Even though the actual investment is often taking place in a
different country, it is always funnelled through a head office that is registered in
Mauritius. Id.
42. See, e.g., Murali Krishnan, Indian Investment in Africa Soars, DW (July 15, 2013),
http://www.dw.com/en/indian-investment-in-africa-soars/a-16951164 (describing the mounting
rivalry between India and China in the pursuit for trade supremacy in Africa, and the resulting
disparity between these countries).
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There is less need for formal legal institutions in predominately rural
economies where contracting parties are bound together in tight social
networks and there are informal mechanisms for enforcing
contracts.... As economies develop and become more complex and
diversified, the need for rule of law and formal legal institutions
increases. Economic growth provides the resources to support
institutional development. Not surprisingly, there is a high correlation
between wealth and rule of law and other good governance indicators.4 3
In the case of China, India, and Africa, formalization means
subscribing to the existing international investment rules and institutions
created to manage their respective relationships with the North. China
and India began their respective voluntary, but cautious, opening up of
their economies approximately a decade apart, with China doing so at the
beginning of the 1980s and India at the beginning of the 1990s.44 By the
year 2000-although India had by then experienced significant economic
growth-critics, including Jeffrey Sachs, had noted that India lagged
behind because of its inadequate reform efforts.4 5
43. Peerenboom, Law and Development, supra note 19, at 492.
44. See Somarajiah, India, China and Foreign Investment, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 2, at 132 (noting the dearth of comprehensive
studies on the subject of the legal aspects of China's and India's domestic and foreign investment
regimes); see also WENHUA SHAN, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU-CHINA INVESTMENT
RELATIONS (Wenhua Shan et al. eds., 2005) (analyzing Asia's open-door policy as a precedent to
the liberalization of trade practices); DAVID SMITH, THE DRAGON AND THE ELEPHANT: CHINA,
INDIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Douglas & McIntyre ed., 2007) (explaining China's and
India's rise in view of the past and present, and assessing where both countries are headed and what
impact they may have on the world); Rohit Sachdev, Comparing the Legal Foundations ofForeign
Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct Investment
Context, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 167, 214 (2006) (exploring the defining characteristics that
have led to greater disparity between China and India in spite of similar economic and demographic
characteristics); Nirupam Bajpai and Jeffrey D. Sachs, Foreign Direct Investment in India: Issues
and Problems 5-8 (Harvard Inst. for Int'l Dev., Discussion Paper No. 759, 2000),
www.cid.harvard.edu/indialpdf/759.pdf [hereinafter Bajpai and Sachs] (identifying the issues and
problems associated with India's current foreign direct investment regime).
45. As Jeffrey Sachs and Nirupam Bajpai wrote in the abstract of their article:
[W]e have attempted to identify the issues and problems associated with India's current
foreign direct investment regime, and more importantly the other associated factors
responsible for India's unattractiveness as an investment location. Despite India offering
a large domestic market, rule of law, low labor costs, and a well working democracy, her
performance in attracting FDI flows has been far from satisfactory. A restrictive FDI
regime, high import tariffs, exit barriers for firms, stringent labor laws, poor quality
infrastructure, centralized ecision-making processes, and a very limited scale of export
processing zones make India an unattractive investment location.
Bajpai and Sachs, supra note 44, at intro. Ilan Strauss and Vasiliki Mavroeidi, at the Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, also reported on their research:
Between 1995-2011, domestic value-added in China's manufacturing exports rose from
52% to 60%. In contrast, India's declined from (an unsustainably high) 87% to 64%.
This decline will eventually need to be arrested. Between 1992-2014, China's high
technology manufacturing exports quadrupled as a share of manufacturing exports, from
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For both China and India, the legal reforms that accompanied general
economic opening up included the conclusion of bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs") and the addition of investment chapters in free trade
agreements.46
Although China began its BIT program earlier than India, it followed
a more cautious and phased approach.47 The most notable features of this
evolution pertain to the progressive addition of national treatment and
acceptance of the arbitrability of the merits of investment claims. The first
generation of Chinese BITs had limited arbitrability to the quantum of
compensation.48
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") Investment Policy Hub, China is currently a
party to 129 bilateral investment treaties and nineteen other treaties with
investment provisions.49 So far, China has been named as a respondent
state in only two known investment arbitration cases, while four Chinese
parties have initiated claims against other respondent states.50
In terms of investment treaty practice, unlike China, it appears that
"India's BIT has not changed much from the mid-1990s when India was
essentially a capital-importing country to the late-2000s when India
6% to 25%; India's only doubled, from 4% to 8.5%. This is partly due to foreign
investors playing a more transformative role: between 2000-2013, foreign firms
increased their share in China's domestic research-and-development (R&D)
expenditures from 18% to 24%, and their share of foreign technology acquisitions from
21% to 61%.
Ilan Strauss and Vasiliki Mavroeidi, How India Can Benefit from FDI: Lessons from China, 194
COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES 1 (Feb. 27, 2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edulfiles/2016/10/No-194-
Strauss-and-Mavroeidi-FINAL.pdf.
46. See Sornarajiah, India, China and Foreign Investment, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 2, at 133-34 (examining the domestic investment
laws and policies in China and India, including the admission of investment, privatization
programs, post-entry national treatment, performance requirements, environment protection versus
property protection, corporate accountability and foreign investment protection, as well as the
bilateral and regional investment treaties concluded by the two economies).
47. See generally Kidane, China's Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 13, at 142-69
(explaining China's BIT approach).
48. See id. at 144-53 (detailing the first generation of Chinese BITs that followed the adoption
of China's open-door policy). See generally NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE
INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (giving a more
comprehensive discussion of the evolution of Chinese BITs).
49. Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/AdvancedSearchBITResults (last visited Oct. 21,
2017).
50. Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Resolution Navigator: China as a Respondent
State, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/42?partyRole=2
(last visited Oct. 21, 2017) (listing the two cases in which China appears as a respondent state,
including Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25,
and Ekran Berhad v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/15).
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started to emerge as a capital-exporting country." 51
According to official Indian government sources, India has signed
eighty-three BITs, called Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreements ("BIPA"), of which seventy-two are in force.52 UNCTAD
record shows that India is a party to thirteen additional treaties with
investment provisions.53 India's earliest BIT was with the United
Kingdom, signed on March 14, 1994, and entered into force on January
6, 1995.54
Although, unlike China, India is not a member of ICSID, 55 it has
ratified the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Award,56 and has adopted an arbitration law modeled
after the UNCITRAL Model Law. 57 China has adopted its own
alternative to the UNCITRAL Model.58
Professor Sornarajah offers some thoughts about the similarities and
51. Prabbash Ranjan, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Public Health: Comparative Insight
from China and India, in Socio-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN EMERGING FREE MARKETS: COMPARATIVE
INSIGHTS FROM INDIA AND CHINA 304-26 (Surya Deva ed., 2016).
52. See List of Countries with whom Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements
(BIPA) has been signed (as on December, 2013), GOV'T OF INDIA DEP'T OF ECON. AFFAIRS,
http://dea.gov.in/bipa (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (listing all official records and BITs signed by
India).
53. See International Investment Agreements, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) (tracking the record of
international investment agreements to promote international investment rules that effectively
foster the sustainable development and inclusive growth of global investment).
54. See Investment Policy Hub, International Bilateral Investment Agreements Navigator:
India, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iialnnerMenu (last
visited Oct. 18, 2017) (listing the countries India shares BITs with, the documenting status of those
treaties, and the dates on which the treaties were signed and took effect).
55. See Database of ICSID Member States, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last
visited Oct. 21, 2017) (listing the ratification status of ICSID Member States, including China,
which ratified the ICSID Convention on January 7, 1993, and India, which has never even signed
the Convention).
56. See Contracting States, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/list+of+contracting+states (last visited Oct. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION] (listing contracting states, including China, which ratified
the New York Convention on January 22, 1987, and India, which ratified it much earlier on July
13, 1960).
57. See Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/I 985Modelarbitrationstatus.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2017) (listing countries that modeled their arbitration laws after the
UNCITRAL Model Law).
58. Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Dec. 20, 2013)
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201312/20131200432698.
shtml.
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differences of Chinese and Indian foreign investment approaches. While
their differences are mainly explained in terms of their differing political
systems and the political and economic choices they have made over the
last couple of decades,
a shared colonial experience in which foreign investment and
international trade were the basis of subsequent political domination of
the two states is the most important of the similarities. India underwent
some three centuries of British colonial rule during which period its
economy was subservient o the interests of the colonial power. The role
of foreign investment in the colonial era was significant. China was no
different. It was not subject to colonialism but subtle controls were
exercised through power.59
Owing to this historical experience and their current standing as both
recipients and exporters of significant capital, India's and China's "treaty
practice demonstrates an ambivalent attitude."60
Although India is not a member of ICSID, it has had twenty different
investment claims against it by mostly European companies, with the
majority still pending.61 Most of the claimants are from the United
Kingdom and other developed countries and route their investments
through Mauritius. They claim violations of the India-UK BIT and India-
Mauritius BIT. 62 Indian companies have also initiated three investment
cases of their own against foreign states.63 This is not surprising because,
59. Sornarajah, India, China, and Foreign Investment, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 2, at 135.
60. Id. at 157; see Sornarajah, India, China and Foreign Investment, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER supra note 2, at 135-36 (offering a similar account about
China's dilemma in the following terms: "With the end of the Opium Wars and treaties such as the
Treaty of Nanjing, a system of extraterritoriality was introduced into China making the Chinese
writ not applicable to European traders in the port cities. The indignity that was involved in the
system could not easily be erased"); see also Mark B. Baker, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: India
and Foreign Direct Investment in the 21st Century, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 389, 412, n.155
(2005) ("India was sensitive to foreign domination; fearful that something similar to the Raj would
occur again, and as a result, adopted these protective governmental policies, even once the period
of colonialism had ended.").
61. See Investment Policy Hub, India as a Respondent State, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2 (last visited Oct.
2016) (listing cases and links to the available information beginning in 2003, in which India has
ten pending investment claims against it as of October 2016; while one case was concluded through
an award in favor of the claimant, the remaining nine were settled).
62. See id. (indicating the Mauritian parties are mostly affiliates of major multinational
corporations); see also Press Release, Bechtel Corp., Bechtel and GE File Arbitration Over Dabhol
Power Company (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.bechtel.com/newsroom/releases/2003/09/bechtel-
ge-file-arbitration-dabhol-power-company/ (detailing the context under which these companies
made systematic attempts to resolve legal and contractual claims leading to arbitration).
63. See Investment Policy Hub, India as a Home State, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=l (last visited Oct. 21,
2017) (indicating the respondent states are the United Kingdom, Germany, and Indonesia on the
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as the 2016 U.S. Department of State Investment Climate Statement
notes, "Indian conglomerates and high technology companies are
generally equal in sophistication and capability to their international
counterparts, while certain industrial sectors, such as information
technology, telecommunications, and engineering are globally
recognized for their innovation and competitiveness."64
In any case, because of the relatively high volume of treaty-based
investment claims against it, India, which joined the international
investment regime reluctantly by signing BITs a decade later than China,
has recently announced that it would overhaul its existing BIT regime.65
To that effect, not only did India serve notice of termination to fifty-seven
countries-including the United Kingdom-and seek to clarify
ambiguities with the remaining twenty-five treaties-including with
China66-India also came up with its own new BIT Model Text.67 The
following Section assesses China's and India's respective investment
treaty experiences with the developed economies of the North before their
relationship with Africa is appraised.
D. Conclusion
China's and India's contemporary political narratives-a function of
the recognition of Africa's economic potential, as it were-is
distinguishable from the Western narrative that often depicted Africa as
a mere recipient of foreign aid, not foreign investment. China began
highlighting Africa's potential as a legitimate economic partner in the late
1990s, and the old aid-dependency narrative started to recede.68 Indeed,
the economic conditions in Africa also began to show remarkable
basis of India's BITs in each instance).
64. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs: Investment Climate Statements 2016, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE (July 5, 2016), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2016/sca/254479.htm.
65. See Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls Its Investment Treaty Regime, FIN.
TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/53bd355c-8203-34af-9c27-7bf990a447dc
(describing developments in India to replace existing BITs with a new set of treaties designed to
strike a balance between investor rights, regulatory space, and investor responsibilities).
66. See id. (describing India's departure from earlier approaches to provide protection to foreign
investors by limiting circumstances under which this protection is afforded).
67. See Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, MYGOV (March 2015)
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master-image/Model%2OText%20for%20the%20lndian
%20Bilateral%201nvestment%2OTreaty.pdf [hereinafter Draft BIT Text] (displaying India's first
Draft BIT Text unveiled in March 2015 for comment and consultations); see also India's Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty Text, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (Dec. 28, 2015),
http://finmin.nic.in/sites/default/files/ModelTextindiaBIT%20%281`%29.pdf?download=l
[hereinafter Model BIT Text] (displaying a significantly modified model of BIT Text adopted in
December 2015).
68. See generally KIDANE, CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 13 (providing an
overview of China-Africa economic relations in recent years).
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progress to the point where it became the fastest-growing continent in
2013.69
The legal infrastructure mainly constituted of BITs, mostly borrowed
and almost completely outdated, is clearly inadequate to meaningfully
regulate the growing complex modem relationship. More importantly,
because the BITs-especially those with India-are mostly replicas of
existing models designed to govern a different kind of relationship, a
careful and systematic customization is necessary to lend meaningful
support to growing economic relations.
II. CHINA'S AND INDIA'S INVESTMENT TREATY EXPERIENCE WITH
DEVELOPED NATIONS OF THE NORTH
A. China and the North
Over the decades, the developed world has begrudgingly embraced
China as an equal economic partner. While China's political system is
always viewed with a considerable degree of suspicion, the legal
safeguards put in place by domestic legal reforms and investment treaties
have enabled economic pragmatism in what is often called a political
vacuum. Despite continued liberalization and opening up of China,
however, the latest Investment Climate Statement of the U.S. Department
of State concludes:
China employs a more restrictive foreign investment regime than its
major trading partners, including the United States. While China was
the world's top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2015,
broad sectors of the economy remain closed to foreign investors. China
relies on a Foreign Investment Catalogue to encourage foreign
investment in some sectors of the economy, while restricting or
prohibiting investment in many others. China's investment approval
regime shields inefficient and monopolistic Chinese enterprises from
competition-especially those companies China attempts to cultivate as
national champions.70
69. See e.g., The World's Fastest Growing Continent: Aspiring Africa, THE ECONOMIST (Mar.
2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21 572773-pride-africas-achievements-should-
be-coupled-determination-make-even-faster (describing Africa's flourishing current state, in which
most of its "countries are at peace ... fewer children bear arms and record numbers go to
school... . HIV infections have fallen by up to three-quarters. Life expectancy rose by a tenth in
the past decade and foreign direct investment has tripled. Consumer spending will almost double
in the next ten years; the number of countries with average incomes above $1,000 per person a year
will grow from less than half of Africa's 55 states to three-quarters").
70. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs: Investment Climate Statements 2016: China,
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In any case, China has for many years been the top recipient of
investment from the developed world. Although the available data does
not classify the sources of the invested capital with complete accuracy, it
is clear that China is one of the top recipients of foreign direct investment,
ranking second only to the United States for many years.7 1 In 2015, for
example, Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China ("PRC")
attracted a combined USD $311 billion direct foreign investment, ranking
second and third (with Hong Kong attracting USD $175 billion and PRC
attracting USD $129 billion). First ranking, the United States attracted
foreign direct investment amounting to USD $380 billion.72 Interestingly,
nearly two-thirds of foreign direct investment in China comes from Hong
Kong.73
China has a special arrangement with Hong Kong for the recognition
of arbitral awards under the New York Convention, but for obvious
reasons does not have an investment treaty.74 China has investment
71. See e.g., UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy
Challenges, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (2016),
http://forms.fdiintelligence.com/report2016/files/ThefDiReport_ 2016.pdf (illustrating the
sources and destination of FDI in Figure 3, indicating that according to MOFCOM's 2015 China
Commerce Yearbook, the top five destinations for China's Outward Direct Investment from 2004-
2014 are Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, United States, and Australia).
72. See id. (indicating that two-way investment between China and the United States is small
given the size of their economies); see generally David Dollar, United States-China Two-way
Direct Investment: Opportunities and Challenges, JOHN L. THORNTON CHINA CENTER,
BROOKINGS INST. 1 (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/us-
china-two-way-direct-investment-dollar.pdf (concluding little cross investment exists between the
U.S. and China, the two largest restrictions on direct investment in many sectors important to U.S.
firms, and indicating that the relatively small amount of Chinese investment in the U.S. can also be
traced to two factors: first, much of the initial impetus for Chinese firms to go out was to secure
natural resources, while the U.S. is not a resource-rich country relative to its GDP or population;
and second, the national security reviews of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. have
soured many Chinese investors on the U.S. market).
73. See China: Foreign Investment, SANTANDER, TRADEPORTAL,
https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/china/foreign-investment (last visited Oct.
29, 2017) (listing FDI stocks by country and inflows by industry indicating the following in 2016:
Hong Kong 73.4 percent; Singapore 5.5 percent; Taiwan 3.5 percent; South Korea 3.2 percent;
Japan 2.5 percent; United States 2 percent; Germany 1.2 percent; and France 0.9 percent).
74. See generally Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Between
the Mainland and Hong Kong, China Law, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/topical/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017)
(detailing the particular arrangement as a subject of curiosity and extensive commentary, because
of the one-country two-systems arrangement between the PRC and Hong Kong, the PRC has
extended the application of the New York Convention to Hong Kong but the two have a special
arrangement for the enforcement of each other's arbitral awards). See Mauricio J. Claver-Carone,
Post-Handover Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Between Mainland China and
Hong Kong SAR: 1999 Agreement vs. New York Convention, 33 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (2002)
(detailing the challenges presented by current Chinese law concerning the enforceability in
Mainland China of Hong Kong arbitral awards); Odysseas G. Repousis, On Territoriality and
International Investment Law: Applying China's Investment Treaties to Hong Kong and Macao, 37
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treaties in force with four of the top eight investors: Singapore, with 5.5
percent of the total investment, has had a BIT with China since February
2, 1986; South Korea, with 3.2 percent, since December 12, 2007; Japan,
with 2.5 percent, since May 14, 1989; and Germany, with 1.2 percent,
since November 11, 2005. The remaining three are Taiwan, the United
States, and France.75
As stated above, China has only twice been named as a respondent
state in an investor-state arbitration. The first arbitration, initiated by
Malaysia's Ekran under the China-Malaysia BIT in 2011, was settled.
The second one, initiated by South Korea's Ansung Housing in 2014,76
has just been concluded with a final award in favor of China.77
MICH. J. INT'L L. 113 (2015) (addressing the application of China's IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao
by examining the territorial application of China's IIAs and analyzing IIAs entered into by Hong
Kong and Macao, thus lending itself to examination of certain aspects of treaty interpretation and
other territorial considerations). See also Weixia Gu, 15 Years of the Handover: The Rise,
Discontent, and Positive Interaction of Cross Border Arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland
China, 9 E. ASIA L. REV. 42 (2013) (analyzing the dual challenges of balancing Hong Kong's need
to facilitate a cross-border arbitration regime which is compatible with Mainland China under the
principle of "one country, two systems"); Weixia Gu, The Changing Landscape of Arbitration
Agreements in China: Has the SPC-Led Pro Arbitration Move Gone Far Enough?, 22 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 1 (2009) (exploring ad hoc arbitration and its implications absent a current legal
framework); Jiali (Keli) Huang, One Country, Two Systems: Hong Kong's Unique Status and the
Development and Growth of Arbitration in China, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 423 (2017)
(tracing the tentative recovery phase of greenfield FDI and highlighting the trajectory of India,
which has surpassed China in terms of its capital investment).
75. See Investment Policy Hub, China: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42#iialnnerMenu (last visited Oct. 24,
2017) (describing China's initial BIT with France that was subsequently terminated and listing the
current status of BITs in China).
76. See Investment Policy Hub, Known Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitrations, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (illustrating investor-state
arbitrations, pending and concluded, including the outcomes of those concluded).
77. See Case Details: Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People's Republic of China,
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/14/25 (describing the
case in which a Korean investor brought a claim that was time-barred, but sought to import a
permissive rule from another China BIT through the MFN provision of the China-Korea BIT,
which was the basis of the claim). In the Final Award, the Tribunal (composed of Professor Lucy
Reed, President, Dr. Michael Pryles, Arbitrator, and Professor Albert Jan van den Berg, Arbitrator)
not only rejected all of the South Korean investor's claims, including the MFN claim, but also
awarded China most of the costs and legal representation fees. Id.; see also Ansung Housing Co.,
Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25, Final Award, IM 136-44, § X
(Mar. 9, 2017):
(1) Dismiss[ing] with prejudice all claims made by Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd.,
in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5); [and] (2)
Award[ing the] Respondent, the People's Republic of China, its share of the direct costs
of the proceeding in the amount of USD $69,760.55, plus 75 percent of its legal fees and
expenses in the amount of USD $4853.25 plus EUR 267,443.10 plus CNY 1,387,500,
plus interest at the rate of three-month LIBOR plus two percent, compounded quarterly,
such interest to run from the 90th day after the date of dispatch of this Award on any
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B. India and the North
The 2016 World Investment Report ranks India as the tenth-top
destination for foreign direct investment for 2014 and 2015, attracting a
total of USD $44 billion.78 Later that year, the FDI Intelligence of the
Financial Times reported that "[t]he big FDI story of the past year is
India. After a long period of trailing behind China, the South Asian
country is now racing past its formidable rival." 79 The report stated the
total amount of committed resources to India was USD $63 billion.80
According to Forbes, the United States is the top investor in India; the
other investors, in descending order, are: Japan, the UK, Germany,
United Arab Emirates, France, Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands,
Singapore, Sweden, China, and South Korea.81 Of the top thirteen
investors, India does not have investment treaties with five of them,
including its top two investors, the United States and Japan.82
As indicated above, India has so far been named in at least twenty
known investment arbitration claims: five from the UK; five from
Mauritius; three from France; three from the Netherlands; and one from
each of the following nations: Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Russian
Federation-Cyprus, and Austria.83
C. China's Precautions and India's Disappointments
China began its BIT program in the early 1980s and has since
employed three generations of its own model-although it has not always
unpaid portion of the amounts due under this Award until the date of payment. Id.
78. See UNCTAD: WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY
CHANGES, 5, Figure 1.4 (2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf (listing
the top twenty host companies for 2014 and 2015).
79. See FDI INTELLIGENCE, THE FDI REPORT 2016: GLOBAL GREENFIELD INVESTMENT (Fin.
Times ed., 2017), https://www.fdiintelligence.com/Landing-Pages/fDi-Report-201 6/The-fDi-
Report-2016 (attributing India's increased FDI to project growth and capital investments).
80. Id.
81. See generally Top 15 Countries Investing in India, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2016)
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/54f4e700da47a54de82440c4/top- 15-countries-
investin/#f563aad77102 (listing the countries with the most corporations making investments in
India).
82. See Investment Policy Hub, supra note 54 (listing date of signature and current status of
India's BIT agreements). The other three top investors which India does not have BITs with are
Spain, Singapore, and South Korea. Id. India has had BITs with the United Kingdom since January
6, 1995, with Germany since July 13, 1998, with United Arab Emirates since August 21, 2014, with
France since May 17, 2000, with Switzerland since February 16, 2000, with the Netherlands since
December 1, 1996, with Sweden since April 1, 2001, and with China since August 1, 2007. Id.
83. See Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2 (last visited Jan. 31,
2017) (listing the cases in which India was sued in a civil action).
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been as systematic or linear as the United States in its BIT program.84
India entered the foray of bilateral investment reaties more than a decade
after China, but adopted the UK's model and essentially duplicated it for
more than a decade, signing the same model with its economic partners
from the North85 and the South without any meaningful adaptations.86
For comparison, China ratified the New York Convention in January
1987,87 joined ICSID in February 1993,88 cautiously adopted its own
model of domestic legislation in August 1994,89 created its own arbitral
institutions,90 and was named in only three cases as a respondent state in
investment matters.91 China's approach was incremental, cautious, and
steady. India's approach, on the other hand, appears rather erratic and
fearful. It refused to join ICSID. It ratified the New York Convention in
84. See Kidane, China's Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 13, at 175-76 (asserting that
China's use of BITs does not present a discernible or intentional pattern).
85. Investment Policy Hub, supra note 54. India's BITs with the developed economies of the
North shows variability. Id. The dispute settlement provisions are good indicators. See, e.g.,
Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: India-Germany BIT, art. 9
UNCTAD (terminated 1995), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/96/treaty/1688
(emphasizing conciliation); India-Australia BIT, art. 12 (terminated 1999),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/96/treaty/209 (adopting the United Kingdom's
model).
86. See supra, Part I.B.ii (discussing Indian investment in Africa). All the Indian BITs with the
African states discussed above are examples of the South-South genre. Id.
87. N.Y ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 56. China ratified the New York Convention on January
22, 1987. Id.
88. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INv. DIsP., DATABASE OF ICSID MEMBER STATES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Oct. 20,
2017). China ratified the ICSID Convention on February 6, 1993. Id.
89. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa (r0AffQ[TI4AMA) [Arbitration Law],
(promulgated by Order No. 31 of the P.R.C. Laws, Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/textjsp?file id=182634.
90. Id. For example, China's model is fairly unusual in its creation of quasi-governmental
arbitral commissions:
Article 10 Arbitration commissions may be established in municipalities directly under
the Central Government and in cities that are the seats of the people's governments of
provinces or autonomous regions. They may also be established in other cities divided
into districts, according to need. Arbitration commissions shall not be established at each
level of the administrative divisions. People's governments of the cities referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall arrange for the relevant departments and chambers of
commerce to organize arbitration commissions in a unified manner. The establishment
of an arbitration commission shall be registered with the administrative department of
justice of the relevant province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the
Central Government.
Id. at art. 10.
91. Investment Policy Hub, supra note 50. The most current case is Hela Schwarz v. China,
filed in 2017 and currently pending. Id. The second most recent is Ansung Housing v. China,
initiated under the China-Republic of Korea BIT in 2014 and decided in favor of China. Id. The
oldest case is Ekran v. China, initiated under the China-Malaysia BIT in 2011 and settled under
undisclosed terms. Id.
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July 196092 and adopted the UNCITRAL Model in 1996.93 It was
criticized for some modifications. It revised it again.94 Then it was named
in at least twenty known investor-state arbitration matters as a respondent
state, and decided to terminate some of its BITs and renegotiate others on
the basis of a new BIT Model Text that it revealed at the end of 2015.
The question remains whether the new BIT Model Text will help India
get over its frustration, streamline its efforts, and produce better results.
Before the Model Text is critically assessed, it is important to take a
closer look at the available information on the twenty cases that caused
India's frustration.
D. India as a Respondent State
As indicated above, India has been named in at least twenty known
investment cases as of this writing. Because India is not a member of
ICSID, all of these cases are ad hoc arbitrations under the UNCITRAL
Rules. The UNCTAD investment hub database contains basic
information on all, and detailed information on some, of these cases. Of
the twenty cases, one has been decided with a final award, nine have been
settled, and ten are still pending. India's experience is similar to the
92. N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, supra note 56. India ratified the New York Convention on July
13, 1960 within a couple of years of its adoption. Id.
93. See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 No. 26, Acts of Parliament,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=207821 (adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration in 1985).
94. See Sumit Rai and Naresh Thacker, The Asia-Pacific Arbitration Review 2016: India,
GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (May 18, 2015),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1036907/india. India adopted the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (Model Law) through the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act). The Indian legislature decided to have one statute governing
domestic and international arbitration, enforcement of foreign awards, and conciliation. Other than
the modifications necessary to adapt to this wider scope, the 1996 Act virtually imported the Model
Law text with minor amendments. It was widely believed that his would ensure India's entry into
the international arbitration arena with a position of strength, coinciding with the economic reforms
that were first initiated in 1991. However, as years rolled by, hope turned to despair. Over the years,
interpretation of certain provisions of the 1996 Act led to strange results, often prolonging the time
parties spent in court. The general perception that wards will be considered final and not reviewed
on the merits was soon dispelled, at least in the case of domestic arbitration involving all Indian
parties. Id. (citing Oil & Natural Gas Corporation v. Saw Pipes (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India)). The
commentary further adds:
As if this was not enough, India's reputation in the international arbitration community
suffered a severe setback when the Supreme Court of India allowed a foreign award to
be challenged in Indian courts under the 1996 Act. India received a lot of flak in the
international sphere and the general sentiment among foreign investors was a distrust of
the dispute redressal mechanism under the 1996 Act.
Id. (citing Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 190
(India)).
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experiences of many African countries in this regard.95 This Section
examines the available data on each case to provide background.
i. Decided Cases
White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic ofIndia is the only one
of the twenty cases that was decided on the merits.96 The 140-page award
offers a useful insight into the realities of the typical treaty-based
investor-state dispute settlement that makes states question the wisdom
of signing onto investment treaties. The White Industries case has all the
hallmarks of a North-South investment arbitration. To begin with, it was
a case initiated by an Australian investor against India in July 2010 on
the basis of a BIT that Australia and India signed in February 1999.97 The
Australian investor, White Industries, represented by Australian lawyers
with the firm of Mallesons Stephen Jaques,98 claimed that India breached
its international obligations under several provisions of the Australia-
India BIT. India, represented by UK lawyers in collaboration with an
Indian firm, denied the allegations.99 The Tribunal was composed of the
Honorable Charles Brower of the United States (claimant's appointee),
Christopher Lau of Singapore (India's appointee), and William Rowley
of Canada (selected by the party-appointed arbitrators as chair).1oo Before
the Tribunal's analysis of the treaty claim is discussed, it is important to
take a brief look at what gave rise to the treaty claim.
An Indian state-owned enterprise, Coal India, hired White Industries
for the development of a coal mine in Piparwar, India, including the
95. See generally Won Kidane, The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID
Legitimacy Debate, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 559, 564 (2014) (arguing that the ICSID was never
designed for, nor has it ever meaningfully served, South-South disputes, which China-Africa
disputes technically are).
96. White Industries Australia Ltd. v. The Republic of India, Final Award, at ¶ I (UNCITRAL
Arb. Nov. 30, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0906.pdf; see
generally Investment Policy Hub, White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/378 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017)
(listing general information about the arbitration).
97. See White Industries, UNCITRAL, Final Award, at ¶¶ 1.1, 1.2 (alleging that India breached
its obligations under Articles 3, 4, 7, and 9 of the BIT).
98. Id. at ¶ 1.4.1. The lawyers for the claimant were Professor Max Bonnell, Jason Clapham,
and Herman Pintos-Lopez. Id. After its merger with the Chinese firm of King Wood, the firm is
now called King Wood Mallesons. See, e.g., Carolina Bolado, King & Wood, Mallesons Merger to
Create Asian Superfirm, LAW360 (Dec. 15, 2011),
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/29381 1/king-wood-mallesons-merge-to-create-asian-superfirm.
(discussing the merger which created the largest law firm headquartered outside of the United States
and the United Kingdom).
99. White Industries, UNCITRAL, Final Award, at ¶ 1.4.2. The Indian firm is Fox Mandel and
Company. Id. The Indian lawyers include: Som Mandel, Mamta Tiwari, and Shaiwal Srivastava.
Id. The UK lawyers were Toby Landau, QC, and Salim Moollan. Id.
100. Id.at¶ 1.5.1.
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supply of equipment for the contract price of USD $206.6 million. 101 The
contract contained a bonus-penalty scheme that mandated a bonus to
White Industries if it exceeded a minimum production target; and, as a
corollary, it imposed a penalty if it failed to meet the minimum production
requirements.102 A dispute subsequently arose in connection with this
bonus-penalty scheme. Coal India believed that White Industries' output
of production failed to meet the quantitative and qualitative requirements
of the contract and sought to impose a penalty. White Industries, on the
other hand, believed that it exceeded the quantitative requirement and
asked for a bonus to be paid.103
Coal India then cashed a Bank Guarantee in the amount of USD $2.77
million. 104 That caused White Industries to initiate an International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") arbitration, which was the mechanism of
dispute settlement hat the two had contractually agreed upon.105 The ICC
Tribunal was composed of Trevor Marling (an Australian nominated by
White Industries), Jevon Reddy (an Indian nominated by Coal India), and
Max Abrahamson (an Irishman appointed by the ICC.) 10 6 Because the
contract did not indicate the seat of the arbitration, the ICC Court decided
it would be Paris, but the actual hearing took place in London upon the
agreement of the parties for reasons of convenience.1 07
The essence of the dispute in the ICC arbitration pertained to the
quality and quantity of production. The claimant said it exceeded targets,
but the respondent argued that the claimant failed to meet the target and
that the quality of what was produced did not meet contractual
specifications.08 The Tribunal had to decide which of the parties was
correct on the basis of the factual record submitted to it. In the treaty-
based investment dispute, however, the Tribunal had to accept all of the
factual determinations of the ICC Tribunal, and indeed began by saying:
"[w]ith few exceptions, the factual matrix out of which this dispute arises
is either agreed or not seriously disputed."109 The ICC Tribunal decided
in favor of the claimant, White Industries, by a majority vote of two
101. Id. at T 3.2.13.
102. Id. at ¶¶ 3.219-21.
103. Id. at ¶f 3.2.24-29.
104. Id. at 3.2.28.
105. Id. at¶3.2.29.
106. Id. at ¶ 3.2.29. The award does not indicate that Max Abrahamson was appointed by the
ICC; but see White Industries Australia Limited v. Coal India Limited, Case No. 2004-5-10, Final
Judgment, at ¶ 2 (Calcutta HC 2004), http://www.the-
laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/CaseCaseld=504002613000.
107. White Industries, UNCITRAL, Final Award, at TT 3.2.30-31.
108. Id. at ¶T 3.2.24-25.
109. Id.at¶3.1.1.
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arbitrators, with the nominee of the respondent, Coal India, dissenting.1 10
Coal India challenged the ICC appointed chair, Abrahamson, on grounds
of bias, but the ICC Court rejected this argument.111 Hence, when the
Tribunal stated the facts were not disputed, it did not mean that the parties
in the ICC arbitration accepted the facts as determined by the ICC
Tribunal. Rather, the nature of the investment dispute did not allow a
review of the facts because the dispute only pertained to allegations of
violations of certain treaty obligations under the BIT between the host
state and the home state of the investor.112
The Tribunal considered eight treaty-based claims: (1) whether White
Industries met the definition of an "investor" and whether its operations
counted as "investment" for purposes of protection; (2) the Tribunal's
jurisdiction; (3) whether India failed to encourage and promote favorable
conditions; (4) whether India breached the fair and equitable treatment
standard; (5) whether India breached the "effective means of asserting
claims" standard; (6) whether India had expropriated investment
belonging to White Industries; (7) whether India disallowed the free
transfer of funds in violation of the BIT standard; and (8) if violation was
proven, whether White Industries should be compensated.113
White Industries' claims, which required a response to each one of the
above-listed claims, arose out of Coal India's attempt to get the ICC
Tribunal's award set aside by the Indian courts and the approximately
nine-year delay of the process.114 The Tribunal decided that White
Industries qualified as an investor and that its operations also qualified as
investment under the BIT. 115 It also ruled that it had the jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claims. 116 The Tribunal rejected all of White Industries'
claims, including the denial of fair and equitable treatment and the related
claim of denial ofjustice. 117 Having rejected all of those claims, however,
110. Id. at ¶¶ 3.2.33-34. In fact, the Tribunal found that the Coal Preparation Plant produced
172,749 tons less than the production target and, as such, Coal India was entitled to a penalty of
USD $969,060; but then it also found that "the performance of the Coal Preparation Plant and the
Coal Handling Plant were not such as to constitute a total filature of consideration." Id. at IM
3.2.33(a)-(b). Finally, White was awarded a bonus and a return of the Bank Guarantee that Coal
India had cashed, i.e., a total of approximately USD $4 million. Id. at IM 3.2.33(c)-(e).
111. Id. at¶3.2.32.
112. Id. at 1.1.1 (finding the India-Australia BIT to be controlling).
113. Id. at¶6.1.1.
114. See id. at ¶ 10.4 (discussing denial of justice as result of the delay).
115. See id. at ¶ 7.4.19 (citing White's substantial financial and work-based commitments,
along with the duration and risk of those commitments, as evidence).
116. See id. at ¶ 8 (concluding that the evidence does not support White's contention that the
conduct of Coal India is properly attributed to India).
117. See id. at ¶M 9-10, 12. The core of the legal dispute and the applicable legal principles are
very well summarized under footnote 69 of the Final Award by one of the arbitrators, Hon. Charles
4312017]
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the Tribunal took an interesting position and found that India violated its
Brower. It is reproduced below for context:
Although there is Supreme Court authority for the proposition that Indian courts can
maintain an application for the setting aside of an award which was not made in India,
the relevant cases have been heavily criticized, and some judges of the Supreme Court
are themselves clearly open to persuasion the other way. While the point is accordingly
not settled, it is evident that, at the time White made its application challenging the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to entertain Coal India's setting aside application,
it could not be decided in White's favor at any level lower than that of a three-judge
bench of the Supreme Court.
Arbitrator Brower is of the view that it is not surprising that the India courts have been subject to
criticism since, to his mind, the clear consensus among States is that only the courts of the seat of
arbitration-i.e., "the country in which ... th[e] award was made" (see Article V (1) (e) of the
New York Convention)-are competent to set aside a foreign arbitral award. See, e.g., Steel Corp.
of the Philippines v. International Steel Services, Inc., U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, 6 Feb. 2008 (United States); Empresa Colombiana de Was Ferreas v. Drummond
Ltd., Colombian State Council, 24 Oct. 2003 and 22 Apr. 2004 (Colombia); Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, High Court of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 27 Mar. 2003 (Hong Kong). He refers to Professor van den Berg's
authoritative treatise on the New York Convention ("The New York Arbitration Convention of
1958" at 350) which explains that:
The "competent authority" as mentioned in Article V(1)(e) [of the New York
Convention] for entertaining the action of setting aside the award is virtually always the
court of the country in which the award was made. The phrase "or under the law of
which" the award was made [in Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention] refers to
the theoretical case that on the basis of an agreement of the parties the award is governed
by an arbitration law which is different from the arbitration law of the country in which
the award was made.
Arbitrator Brower concludes that, contrary to the Indian courts' findings, a choice of Indian law as
the law governing the contract is not considered under the New York Convention to imply a choice
of Indian arbitration law displacing the arbitration law of the seat of arbitration. "The New York
Arbitration Convention of 1958" at 293.
If the parties provide a general choice of law clause, they intend to give a directive to the
arbitrator as to which law he has to apply to the substance. The distinction between
substance and procedure would then preclude that the directive given to the arbitrator
would also be an "indication" of a choice of the law governing the arbitration. It would
therefore seem that the latter can be achieved only by a distinct express
agreement.... Thus if a contract contains a general choice of law clause and provides
in the arbitral clause that arbitration is to be held in a country with a different law, the
latter indication [(i.e., "that the choice of law clause for the contract in general is not
sufficient as choice of law for the arbitral clause")] must be deemed to prevail over the
former [(i.e., that the choice of law clause for the contract in general "also applies to the
arbitral clause")]. Id.
For Arbitrator Brower, the 1996 Act cannot justify the actions of the Indian judiciary since, as
explained by Professor van den Berg, the New York Convention supersedes domestic law
concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards:
[S]ome courts still seem to have difficulties in applying the Convention's principle that
it supersedes domestic law concerning the enforcement of foreign awards.... The
grounds for refusal of enforcement mentioned in Article V, or, as the case may be, in the
corresponding Article in the implementing Act, are exclusive if the enforcement is
governed by the Convention, and do not leave any room for reference to the law of the
forum on this point. Id. at 268.
White Industries, UNCITRAL, Final Award, at 110.4.11 n.69.
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obligation to provide "effective means of asserting""1 8 and "enforcing"
claims. 119 Technically, that provision is not even a part of the applicable
India-Australia BIT, but the Tribunal imported this standard from the
India-Kuwait BIT through the most favored nation treatment ("MFN")
provision contained in the Australia-India BIT. 120 Substantively, the
Tribunal ruled that India violated this principle mainly because of the
delay in its court system.12 1 In the Tribunal's own words:
In these circumstances, and even though we have decided that he nine
years of proceedings in the set aside application do not amount to a
denial ofjustice, the Tribunal has no difficulty in concluding the Indian
judicial system's inability to deal with White's jurisdictional claim in
over nine years, and the Supreme Court's inability to hear White's
jurisdictional appeal for over five years, amounts to undue delay and
constitutes a breach of India's voluntarily assumed obligation of
providing White with "effective means" of asserting claims and
enforcing rights.122
Although the Investment Tribunal arrived at this conclusion through
lengthy and complicated legal reasoning, the decision is essentially a
judgment on the quality of the judicial system in India. At the technical
level, through intricate legal reasoning, the Investment Tribunal found
itself reviewing the grounds of refusal of enforcement under the New
York Convention and the relevant Indian law that incorporated those
principles, and it concluded that none of the grounds of refusal applied.123
Indeed, this goes to the heart of the classic dilemma in international
investment law about the superior treatment of foreign nationals and
interests. At the end of the day, India found itself having to live with two
arbitral decisions that it did not consider fair or appropriate. In the ICC
arbitration, it challenged the ICC-appointed chair on grounds of bias, but
the ICC Court rejected its claim. The ICC Tribunal made a factual
determination by a majority vote which included the arbitrator who was
challenged. India obviously did not think those determinations were right.
It sought a review by its own courts. Another Tribunal held that it failed
118. See White Industries, UNCITRAL, Final Award, at ¶ 11.4.19 (explaining India's
violation).
119. See id. at ¶ 11.4.4 (analyzing "enforcing" separately).
120. See id. at ¶ 11.1.1 (noting Art. 4(2) of the India-Australia BIT contains the MFN clause);
see also id. at ¶ 11.1.4 (noting the India-Kuwait BIT at art. 4(5) contains the "effective means of
asserting and enforcing rights" standard).
121. See id. at ¶ 11.4.5 (noting that the proceedings were conducted in an untimely manner
starting with Coal India being allowed to file its initial reply and formal objections in an untimely
manner and continuing to "drag[] on" in this manner).
122. Id. at 1 11.4.19. The Tribunal finally held that "India is in breach of Article 4(2) of the
BIT." Id. at ¶ 11.4.20.
123. See id. at ¶¶ 2.33-14.2.66 (examining the application of the grounds of refusal).
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to provide meaningful judicial remedy, i.e., that the Indian judicial system
was inadequate for the Australian investor. The Tribunal's summary of
the facts and India's arguments make it clear that Coal India believed that
White Industries failed to meet its contractual obligations and was
disappointed when a tribunal that it thought was biased held against it by
a majority vote containing the allegedly biased arbitrator, who was
appointed by the ICC.1 24 It is important to remember that the only Indian
in the whole saga did not agree with the Australian investor. India sought
to remedy the injustice it felt by going to court, but then another tribunal
held that the way the Indian courts handled the matter violated its
international obligations.
Despite its resistance to joining the ICSID Convention, India ended up
getting a tribunal that looked entirely like an ICSID tribunal as a result of
the BITs that it had reluctantly signed. Again, it joined the BIT program
late, but it was not spared of the disappointments. Unfortunately for India,
White Industries was just the beginning.
ii. Settled and Pending Cases
So far, India has settled at least nine known investment claims.
Although detailed information on each is not publicly available, the
available information offers additional background on India's
disappointment and its decision to renegotiate its BITs on the basis of a
new Model.
By far the most publicized and highly complicated claims that India
has faced related to the USD $2.9 billion Dabhol Power Project.125 The
participants of the project ranged from an Indian local government, to
Enron, to the United States government. When in 1992 the Indian
government revealed its interest in partnering with foreign investors for
the development of its power sector, it received enthusiastic and capable
supporters, including Enron, which quickly raised USD $1.9 billion in
project debt from banks, offshore commercial lenders, and others,
including Bechtel and General Electric.126 The United States' Overseas
Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") provided an additional USD
$160 million, with added coverage of $200 million for political risk.127At
that time, although India approached the World Bank for additional
124. Id. at ¶ 5.
125. See Kenneth Hansen, Robert C. O'Sullivan and W. Geoffrey Anderson, The Dabhol Power
Project Settlement: What Happened? And How?, INFRASTRUCTURE J. (2005),
https://ijglobal.com/articles/30062/the-dabhol-power-project-settlement-what-happened-and-how
(summarizing the history of the project and the various arbitrations and settlements).
126. See id. at I (explaining Enron's financing interests).
127. Id.
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financing, the World Bank refused, concluding that the Dabhol project
was "not economically viable."1 28 Sure enough, "the predictions that the
project consisted of too much, too soon proved ... to be prescient. It was
clear by 2001 that MSEB [the Maharashtra State Electricity Board]
neither needed, nor could afford the energy it had committed to buy from
the project."1 29
Indeed, the Dabhol debacle led to no fewer than thirty arbitrations and
judicial proceedings, including a state-to-state arbitration that the United
States initiated against India.130 As commentators noted:
The looming $6 billion Bechtel and GE arbitration, the USG [United
States government] arbitration, the offshore banks' threatened
arbitrations under bilateral investment treaties, the shortage of power in
Maharashtra, and even general frustration and the size of mounting
expenses may all have contributed to the sudden change in the Indians'
negotiating position in March 2005, and all therefore continued to the
comprehensive commercial settlement hat was achieved.131
The investment case listed as Bechtel v. India under the India-
Mauritius BITI 32 grew out of the same circumstances that gave rise to
one of the reported ICC arbitrations: Capital India Power Mauritius I &
Energy Enterprises (Mauritius) Company v. Maharashtra Power
Development Cooperation.133 In that case, an ICC Tribunal composed of
James H. Carter, Louis A. Craco, and Jonathan Rosner awarded more
than USD $125 million to the Mauritian subsidiaries of the U.S.-based
Bechtel Enterprises and General Electric.134 The UNCTAD Investment
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2. The passage continues:
The October 2000 payment due from MSEB went unpaid until January 2001 when the
state Government stepped in to bail out the cash-strapped MSEB. Months of slow
payments, and non-payments followed. By June, the properties had collapsed. By
December 2001, Enron was no longer capable of maintaining its core operations, much
less prepared to invest in the defense of a large, troubled project. Thus, by late 2001, the
fate of the world's largest independent power project and the largest foreign investment
in India was put in the hands of creditors, minority investors, defaulting governmental
stakeholders and lawyers. Id.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id.
132. See Investment Policy Hub, Bechtel v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/AdvancedSearchBITResults (la t visited Oct. 30, 2017)
(comparing the circumstances between different BIT cases).
133. Capital India Power Mauritius I & Energy Enterprises (Mauritius) Company v.
Maharashtra Power Development Corporation, Case No. 12913/MS (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.),
https://www.italaw.com/documents/Dabholaward_050305.pdf [hereinafter Mauritius Award].
134. See Luke Eric Peterson, Bechtel Subsidiary Wins Arbitration with Indian State of
Maharashtra, INVEST-SD: INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY NEWS BULLETIN (May 5, 2005),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/201 0/10/investmentinvestsdmay5_2005.pdf
(explaining the Mauritian award).
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hub database shows that India settled the investment claim for USD $160
million. 135 The ICC Tribunal did issue a final award in Capital India
Power.136 Although the case was initiated by many shareholders against
the Indian shareholder, Maharashtra Power Development Cooperation,
the only claimant that lasted until the issuance of the award was Energy
Enterprises (Mauritius) Company ("EEMC"), a Bechtel subsidiary. The
Indian shareholder refused to participate in the arbitral proceedings,
failing to accept the Tribunal's jurisdiction. However, the claimant
managed to have a tribunal formed1 37 and a favorable award issued to it
all without the respondent's participation.138 Having held that the Indian
135. See id. (noting India's settlement).
136. Mauritius Award, Case No. 12913/MS. The Indian Shareholder or Party, as the Tribunal
described it, is:
Respondent Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited ("MPDCL") is also
a party to the DPC Shareholders Agreement. It is a special purpose entity, having been
created under circumstances that will be later discussed for the sole purpose of holding
shares in DPC on behalf, it is alleged, of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board
("MSEB"). Id. at 3.
137. The Award further held:
On October 26, 2003, the federal court in New York granted a default judgment
compelling MPDCL to participate in this proceeding. MPDCL neither obeyed the order
nor designated an arbitrator. Accordingly, as contemplated by the Shareholders
Agreement, EEMC petitioned the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to exercise thejurisdiction conferred by the United States
Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. section 206) to designate an arbitrator in lieu of
MPDCL. The petition was granted, and on February 19, 2004, the Court appointed
Jonathan Rosner to act as co-arbitrator. On March 26, 2004, the ICC Court confirmed
Mr. Carter and Mr. Rosner as co-arbitrators. On April 28, 2004, the ICC Court confirmed
Louis A. Craco as Chairman, upon the joint nomination of the co-arbitrators. Id. at ¶ 11-
12.
138. Id. at 30-31. On the basis of these findings, the arbitral Tribunal concluded:
First, MPDCL violated Section 2.5(a) of the Shareholders Agreement, which required
the shareholders to vote for each other's nominees in order to ensure the election of each
shareholder's designated members, by failing to vote in concert with the other
shareholders to constitute a functioning board of directors in May 2002 and thereafter.
Second, MPDCL repeatedly violated section 5.4 of the Shareholders Agreement by
failing to act in good faith in the best interest of DPC in matters in which its Affiliates,
MSEB and SOM, were involved adversely to DPC, and by acting instead in the best
interests of those Affiliates.
Third, MPDCL repeatedly violated section 8.1 of the Shareholders Agreement by
initiating and maintaining judicial and administrative proceedings adverse to DPC and
its other shareholders instead of submitting such matters to international arbitration as it
was required to do; by maintaining proceedings in such forums designed to frustrate such
arbitral proceedings, including the instant case, when they had properly been initiated by
DPC or the other shareholders; and by disobeying the orders of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, rendered pursuant to Section 8.1 and 8.2
of the Shareholders Agreement compelling it to arbitrate the instant dispute before this
Arbitral Tribunal.
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shareholder engaged in total expropriation of the claimant's interests, the
Tribunal awarded a total of USD $94.9 million, plus interest, as well as
costs of the Tribunal and costs of representation.139 The Indian
shareholder's level of frustration in this case was such that it refused to
participate. A tribunal with little mercy was appointed and blamed the
project failure on it, even calling it expropriation when it was clear that
the project's failure was the fault of all parties.
In addition to the composition of the Tribunal, a few more things are
interesting in this case. The selected law was that of New York and the
appointing authority was given to a district court in New York.
Furthermore, because it was an ICC arbitration, it fell under the ICC
Court's "oversight" jurisdiction, which confirmed the arbitrators. The
Indian party did everything wrong in negotiating an arbitration
agreement, not an uncommon misstep in developing countries. It is
entirely possible that the Indian party had not given the dispute settlement
provision careful thought.
In these and more than thirty cases that arose out of the Dabhol
debacle, India suffered the consequences of poor project appraisal that all
parties were guilty of, yet it disproportionately bore those consequences.
Clearly, the investors were able to use arbitration not only as a means of
dispute settlement, but also as a means of extracting concessions. At the
Fourth, MSEB and SOM are "Affiliates" of MPDCL, and of each other, as that term is
defined in the Shareholders Agreement.
Fifth, MSEB and SOM by their acts described above separately and taken as a course of
conduct each breached the provisions of Project Contracts, including the PPA, the SOM
Guarantee and the SSA. Pursuant to the terms of Section 7.2 of the Shareholders
Agreement, MPDCL is liable to the Claimant for its losses and damages arising out of
those wrongful acts and course of conduct.
Sixth, MPDCL was the agent and alter ego of SOM and MSEB, and, accordingly, they
are liable to Claimant for the damages for which MPDCL is itself found liable in this
proceeding.
Seventh, the coordinated course of conduct, including the several breaches found above,
are all in violation of the Shareholders Agreement, the law of the State of New York
which governs that contract, and the applicable standards of international law requiring
recognition of written agreements to submit to international arbitration and forbidding
uncompensated expropriation of Claimant's property.
Eighth, the coordinated course of conduct, including the several breaches found above,
operated as a total expropriation of the Claimant's investment in the Project, and resulted
in depriving Claimant of its fundamental rights in the Project and the entire benefit of its
investment therein. Id.
139. See id. at 32-34 (analyzing the Tribunal's partial grant and partial denial of damages in
favor of Claimant).
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end of the day, although it is difficult to say whether India's decision to
sign the BITs helped it attract investment or not, as commentators note,
at least in this instance:
There can be little doubt . .. that, all else equal, the xistence of Dabhol
makes investors wiser and slower in committing their resources to
India. The attraction is still there, but the calculation today has to
compensate for risks that, before Dabhol, would not have been given as
much weight.140
Standard Bank also initiated separate investment arbitrations on the
basis of the India-UK BIT. The case settled after two arbitrators were
appointed (Schreuer, C.H., and Greenwood, C.) but before the case was
considered.14 1 Seven more cases initiated by investors from various
countries arising out of the same Dabhol project failure also settled. 142
The details of the settlements are not publicly known, but it is clear that
India must have been frightened not only by the sheer volume of the cases
filed against it and the amount of money claimed, but also the
composition of the tribunals, which consisted of almost no one from India
or even other developing countries who would be sympathetic to the
predicaments of governments of developing countries.
Between 2012 and 2016, ten more investment claims were filed against
India. Unlike the nine Dabhol project-related cases, most of the ten cases
filed since 2012 did not arise out of related factual circumstances.
140. Hansen, O'Sullivan and Anderson, supra note 125.
141. Investment Policy Hub, Standard Chartered Bank v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/152 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
142. These cases include: Offshore Power v. India (2004) under the India-Netherlands BIT
(1995), Arbitrators: Marc Lalonde (Canada) and Lord Cooke, see Investment Policy Hub, Offshore
Power v. India, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/139 (last visited
Oct. 30, 2017); Erste Bank v. India (2004) under the India-Austria BIT (1999), see Investment
Policy Hub, Erste Bank v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/141 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017); Credit Suisse
v. India (2004) under the India-Switzerland BIT (1997), Arbitrators: Christoph H. Schreuer
(Austria) and Christopher Greenwood (UK), see Investment Policy Hub, Credit Suisse v. India,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/150 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017);
Credit Lyonnas v. India (2004) under the India-France BIT (1997), Arbitrators: Christoph H.
Schreuer (Austria) and Christopher Greenwood (UK), see Investment Policy Hub, Credit Lyonnas
v. India, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/148 (last visited Oct. 30,
2017); BNP Paribas v. India (2004) under the India-France BIT (1997), Arbitrators: Christoph H.
Schreuer (Austria) and Christopher Greenwood (UK), see Investment Policy Hub, BNP Paribas v.
India, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/147 (last visited Oct. 30,
2017); ANZEF v. India (2004) under the India-UK BIT (1994), Arbitrators: Schreuer, C. H. and
Greenwood, C., see Investment Policy Hub, ANZEF v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/151 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017); ABNAmro v.
India (2004) under the India-Netherlands BIT (1995), Arbitrators: Christoph H. Schreuer (Austria)
and Christopher Greenwood (UK), see Investment Policy Hub, ABN Amro v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/149 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
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Chronologically, the first of the ten is Tenoch Holdings v. India.143 The
case was filed by a foreign investor in the telecom sector under the India-
Russian Federation BIT (1994) and the India-Cyprus BIT (2002) for
alleged violations of the fair and equitable treatment principle, denial of
justice, and discrimination, among others.144 The investor claimed
damages in the amount of USD $400 million. The arbitrators were
Bernardo Sepulveda Amor (Mexico), the Honorable Charles Brower
(United States), and Brigitte Stern (France).145
In Devas v. India, the investor sought USD $1 billion in compensation
for indirect expropriation and other alleged violations of standards
contained in the India-Mauritius BIT.146 In this PCA-administered
UNCITRAL case, the arbitrators were: Marc Lalonde (Canada), David
R. Haigh (Canada), and Anil Dev Singh (India). The claimant was
represented by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, and the
respondent was represented by Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
LLP.1 47
In KHML v. India, Khaitan Holding Mauritius Limited ("KHML")
claimed USD $1.4 billion for alleged violations of the India-Mauritius
BIT because of actions taken by the Indian Supreme Court in cancelling
a telecom license.148 In this UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, the
arbitrators were Francis Xavier (appointed by the claimant) and Brigitte
Stern (appointed by the respondent). The chair was not identified.149
In Deutsche Telekom v. India, a German-based telecom company
initiated an UNCITRAL arbitration claiming an undisclosed amount of
compensation for violations of the 1995 India-Germany BIT. 150 The facts
of this case are related to the Devas case, as Deutsche had invested with
Devas. The arbitrators in this case were: Gabriele Kaufmann-Kohler
(Switzerland, president), Brigitte Stern (France, respondent's appointee),
and Daniel M. Price (United States, claimant's appointee).151
143. Tenoch Holdings Limited, Maxim Naumchenko, & Andrey Poluektov v. The Republic of
India, PCA Case No. 2013-23 (2012), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/6.
144. For a basic discussion, see Investment Policy Hub, Tenoch Holdings v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/491 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
145. Id.
146. CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telecom
Devas Mauritius Limited v. Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09 (2013),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/46.
147. Id.
148. Investment Policy Hub, Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/553 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
149. See id. (identifying the arbitrators).
150. Investment Policy Hub, Deutsche Telekom v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/550 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
151. See id. (naming the arbitrators).
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In Vodafone v. India, the investor initiated the UNCITRAL arbitration
under the 1995 India-Netherlands BIT, objecting to the Indian
government's imposition of certain taxes.152 The arbitrators were Yves
Fortier (Canada, claimant's appointee) and Oreamuno Blanco (Costa
Rica, respondent's appointee replacing former Chief Justice of India,
R.C. Lahoti).153 The chair is not known. The government was represented
by Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle.154
In LDA v. India, the French claimant alleged violations of some
principles of the 1997 BIT between India and France arising out of a
construction project.155 In this PCA-administered UNCITRAL
arbitration, the arbitrators were: Jean E. Kalicki (president), Julian D.M.
Lew (claimant's appointee), and Christopher Thomas (respondent's
appointee).156 The claimant was represented by Vaughan Lowe and Tariq
Baloch in London and J. Sagar Associates in Mumbia.157 The respondent
was represented by Foley Hoag's Washington office. 158
Cairn v. India concerned a claim arising out of a tax assessment in the
oil and gas industry.159 The claimant, Cairn, alleged violations of some
principles of the 1994 India-UK BIT and claimed compensation in the
amount of USD $1 billion. 160 The arbitrators were Laurant Levy
(Switzerland, president) Stanimir A. Alexandrov (United States/Russia,
claimant's appointee), and Christopher Thomas (Canada, respondent's
appointee.)161
Similarly, in Vedata v. India, the claimant sought USD $3 billion in
compensation for a tax assessment pertaining to the company's oil and
gas operations that i denied it owed and alleged violations of certain
provisions of the 1994 India-UK BIT.1 62 The arbitrators were Michael
152. Investment Policy Hub, Vodafone International BV v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/581 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
15 3. Id.
154. See Vodafone, Gov't Agree to Extend Date for Selection of Third Arbitrator, Bus.
STANDARD (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/voda-govt-
agree-to-extend-date-for-selection-of-3rd-arbitrator-l 14091601079_.html (identifying the
representative parties).
155. Louis Freyfus Armoteurs SAS v. The Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2014-26 (2014),




159. Cairn Energy PLC and Cairn UK Holdings Limited v. The Republic of India, PCA Case
No. 2016-7 (2016), https://www.italaw.com/cases/5709; Investment Policy Hub, Carin v. India,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/691 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
160. Cairn Energy, PCA Case No. 2016-7.
161. See id. (explaining the parties and claims).
162. Investment Policy Hub, Vedanta Resources PLC v. India, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/733 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
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Hwang (United Kingdom/Singapore, president), James Spigelman
(Australia, claimant's appointee), and McRae, D.M. (Canada,
respondent's appointee).163
South Asia Entertainment Holdings Limited v. India is based on the
India-Mauritius BIT for allegations of unfair and biased criminal
investigations by the government.164 In this UNCITRAL arbitration, the
claimant appointed Peter Leaver (UK).165 No other information is
available as of this writing.
The last case is Astro All Asia Networks v. India. This case was
initiated under the India-UK BIT but was based on the same factual
163. Id.; see also Press Release, Vedanta Resources PLC: Notice of Claim served under
Bilateral Investment Treaty (Mar. 27, 2015)
https://www.cairnindia.com/sites/default/files/press-releases/2015-03-27_RNSVED%20_BIT-
Claim.pdf. The press release issued by the claimant states the following:
27 March 2015
Vedanta Resources plc
Notice of Claim served under Bilateral Investment Treaty
As notified on 13 March 2015, Cairn India Limited ("Cairn India"), a subsidiary of
Vedanta Resources Plc ("Vedanta"), has received an assessment order from the Indian
Income Tax Department regarding a decision by the Government of India ("GOI") in
2012 to amend the Indian Income Tax Act 1961 to impose retrospective tax on various
prior transactions. In this respect, Vedanta's Board of Directors has instructed counsel
to file a Notice of Claim against the GOI ("Notice") under the UK-India bilateral
investment treaty (the "BIT") in order to protect its legal position and shareholder
interests.
The Notice relates to the retrospective tax legislation passed by the GOI and a related
tax demand made against Cairn India, an Indian company in which Vedanta has an
approximate 59.9% interest. The tax demand is for an alleged failure to deduct
withholding tax on alleged capital gains arising during 2006-07 in the hands of Cairn
UK Holdings Limited, Cairn India's erstwhile parent company, a subsidiary of Cairn
Energy Plc. The sums demanded from Cairn India total INR 204,947,284,528
(equivalent to approximately USD $3,473,642,264 of "tax", and the same amount again
as "interest". If enforced, such tax demand would have serious consequences for Cairn
India and therefore Vedanta's investment in Cairn India. Vedanta understands that a
parallel tax demand has also been made by the Indian Income Tax Department on Cairn
UK Holdings Limited. The Notice was served under, and is the first step required prior
to the commencement of international arbitration pursuant to, the BIT. The BIT provides
that the GOI is obliged, amongst other things, to accord fair and equitable treatment to
investors and to provide full protection and security to investments. Vedanta and Cairn
India have been advised by leading international counsel that the retrospective tax
legislation passed is a violation of protections accorded to investors under the BIT and
constitutes a serious impairment of the treaty rights of Vedanta. Vedanta and Cairn India
will continue to take all necessary steps to protect their interest and the interest of their
shareholders.
164. Investment Policy Hub, Astro and South Asia Entertainment Holdings Limited v. India,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/735 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
165. Id.
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allegations of unfair and biased criminal investigation by the
government.16 6 The claimant appointed Peter Leaver (UK). 167 No other
information is available as of this writing.
ArbitratorCase Name Arbitrator Name N ato
Nationality
Capital India Power
Mauritius ] & Energy Dame Rosalyn Higgans; Lord Cooke Zealand;
Enterprises Company v. Thorndon; Martin Hunter UK
India
Canada;
. Marc Lalonde and Lord Cooke of ne
Offshore Power v. India TodnNew
Thorndon Zealand
Erste Bank v. India Christoph Schreuer; Christopher Austria; UK
Greenwood
Credit Suisse v. India Christoph Schreuer; Christopher Austria; UK
Greenwood
Credit Lyonnas v. India Christoph Schreuer; Christopher Austria; UK
Greenwood
BNP Panibas v. India Christoph Schreuer; Christopher Austria; UK
Greenwood
ANZEF v. India Christoph Schreuer; Christopher Austria; UK
Greenwood
ABN Amro v. India Christoph Schreuer; Christopher Austria; UK
Greenwood
Mexico;
Bemardo Sepillveda-Amor, Charles United
N. Brower; Brigitte Stem States;
France
CC/Devas Ltd., Devas




KHML v. India Francis Xavier; Brigitte SteF Singapore;
France
France;
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United
Louis Dreyfus Armateurs Jean Kalicki; Julian D.M. Lew; State
SAS v. India Christopher Thomas anada
Canada
Switzerland,
LCvy Kaufmann-Kohler; Stanimi United
Alexandrov; Christopher Thomas States;
Canada
Michael Hwang; James Spigelman; Singapore;
Vedanta v. India 'hl ag Jae Australia;
Donald McRae CndCanada
South Asia Entertainment Peter Leaver; Michael Moser; UK; United
Holdings Limited v. India Reed, L. States
Astro Asia Networks v. Peter Leaver; Michael Moser; UK; United
India Reed, L. States
UK; UnitedJ. William Rowley; Charles Brower; U;IJie
White Industries v. India ChrisRohe Ca States;
Christopher Lau SigprSingapore
Standard Charted Bank v. Christoph Schreuer; Christopher
India Greenwood
Bechtel v. India Charles Renfrew; David Jay; Robert United
Layton States
Case Still Pending as of 2016 (No
Information on Arbitrators)
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India seems to have done everything wrong. First, unlike China, it
failed to make its own alternative to the UK BIT Model, replicating it
over and over again with almost all of its partners from the North and the
South. It earned a poor reputation for refusing to join ICSID, but did not
avoid ICSID-like arbitral proceedings. In the twenty cases in which India
was named as a respondent state, the composition of nearly all of the
tribunals was unfavorable, with 83 percent from the developed world of
the North. The results have been a total disappointment.
China, on other hand, adopted its own alternative BIT Model,
modifying it as its economy progressed. It joined ICSID on its own
schedule, and despite the enormity of the investment that it attracted from
the North over the last three decades, it avoided upsetting arbitral cases-
even winning the only case that proceeded to final disposition.168
168. See Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25,
Final Award (Mar. 9, 2017) (highlighting China's victory).
China's and India's Differing Experiences
To add to India's follies, it is now seeking to renegotiate almost all of
its existing and future BITs on the basis of an unusual BIT Model Text-
a strategy that is unlikely to meaningfully address its intractable
problems. The next Section critically appraises India's new BIT Model
Text as an example of the contemporary backlash against the existing
system and the implications for future South-South relations; particularly,
its implications for Africa's relations with the Asian giants.
III. TiE NEW INDIAN BIT MODEL TEXT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
AFRICA
As indicated in Section II, India was highly suspicious of the
international investment legal regime dominated by ICSID from the very
beginning, deciding not to join. It could not, however, avoid the worst
consequences of the investor-state dispute settlement system. Highly
disappointed by its record of arbitral decisions against it, India decided to
reverse course and come up with a new BIT model purporting to remedy
the perceived inequities and shortcomings of the borrowed existing
Model. This Section critically appraises the new Indian BIT Model Text
in light of its implications for Africa.
A. Evolution of the Draft and the Final Model Text: A Comparative
Look
Before settling on the existing draft, India circulated a draft for
comments and consultation, which informed the substance of the final
draft. The present Model Text is a product of comments from interested
parties on the previous draft,169 unveiled in March 2015 ("Indian Draft
BIT Model Text" or "Draft BIT Text").170 This Section outlines the
salient features of India's overreaction in the Draft BIT Text and its
retraction of some of the unusual provisions in the approved Final BIT
Model Text ("Indian Final BIT Model Text" or "Final BIT Model") 171
for purposes of assessing its implications for Africa.
169. See Grant Hanessian & Kabir Duggal, The Final 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is This the
Change the World Wishes to See?, 32 ICSID REV.- FOREIGN INV. L.J. 216, 216, n.6 (2017) (citing
LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, ANALYSIS OF THE 2014 DRAFT MODEL INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY REPORT NO. 260 (Aug. 2015)). See also Jane Kelsey, India's New Model BIT: A
Comparative Analysis, MADHYAM (May 6, 2016) http://www.madhyam.org.in/indias-new-
model-bit-a-comparative-analysis/ (explaining India's new model BIT).
170. Model BIT Text, supra note 67.
171. See Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Cabinet, Model Text
for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (Dec. 16, 2015)
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133411 (noting the revised Indian Model BIT).
On December 16, 2015, the Press Information Bureau of the Government of India announced:
The Union Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi has given its
approval for the revised Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty. The
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B. Fundamental Assumptions
Over the years, BITs have generally been promoted as a means of
encouraging foreign direct investment. As the role they play in attracting
foreign investment came under increasing scrutiny,172 perambulatory
texts in investment treaties began to demonstrate some variation. The
Indian Draft BIT Model Text and the Final BIT Model Text are
demonstrations of this variability. The Draft BIT Text begins with this
preamble:
Reaffirming the right of Parties to regulate Investments in their territory
in accordance with their Law and policy objectives including the right
to change the conditions applicable to such Investments; and Seeking
to align the objectives of Investment with sustainable development and
inclusive growth of the Parties.173
The focus is entirely on the state's right to regulate and promote
sustainable development. By contrast, the old UK Model that India has
used over the years focuses on the investor and promotion of investment
and the investor's rights. The text of the preamble demonstrates the
contrast well:
Desiring to create conditions favourable for fostering greater
investment by investors of one State in the territory of the Other State;
recognising that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under
international agreement of such investment will be conducive to the
stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity
in both States.174
While the Draft BIT Text espoused a notable departure from the
original BIT assumptions, the Final BIT Model settled for the following
compromise language:
Desiring to promote bilateral cooperation between the Parties with
respect to foreign investments; and Recognizing that the promotion and
revised Indian model text for Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) will replace the existing
Indian Model BIT. The revised model BIT will be used for re-negotiation of existing
BITs and negotiation of future BITs and investment chapters in Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation Agreements (CECAs) Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreements (CEPAs) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Id.
See also Draft BIT Text, supra note 67. For the official approved and signed final BIT Model Text
see F. No. 26/5/2013-iC, Department of Economic Affairs (Investment Division), Ministry of
Finance, Government of India (Dec. 28, 2015).
172. See, e.g., KARL P. SAUVANT AND LISA E. SACHS, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (expressing doubts about the
impact of BITs on investment attraction).
173. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at pmbl.
174. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, India-UK, Mar. 14, 1994, 27 India Cm 2797, pmbl. [hereinafter India-UK BIT].
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the protection of investments of investors of one Party in the territory
of the other Party will be conducive to the stimulation of mutually
beneficial business activity, to the development of economic
cooperation between them and to the promotion of sustainable
development, Reaffirming the right of Parties to regulate investments
in their territory in accordance with their law and policy objectives.175
India's overreaction was such that the Draft interestingly omitted
"protection" from the preamble, a concept considered the main pillar of
the whole investment regime.
C. Substantive Rules
Both the Draft BIT Text and the Final Indian BIT Model Text covers
most substantive and procedural areas commonly covered by investment
treaties of all types, including the meaning of investment itself, the
treatment of investment, expropriation and consequences, and dispute
settlement. The important provisions are discussed below in comparative
context.
i. Meaning of Investment
The Draft BIT Text replaces the definition of investment and investor
with a more detailed and substantially different formulation:
"Investment" means an Enterprise in the Host State, constituted,
organised and operated in compliance with the Law of the Host State
and owned or controlled in good faith by an Investor:
(i) in accordance with this Treaty; and (ii) that is at all times in
compliance with the obligations in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Chapter
III of this Treaty.176
The most notable additions here are the requirement of "good faith"
and compliance with certain other independent obligations enumerated in
other provisions that are not typically associated with the meaning of
"investment." For example, Article 9 imposes an obligation not to engage
in corrupt activities and sets forth detailed rules on what is prohibited,
including what looks like lobbying. Technically, therefore, violation of
the anti-corruption provision would deny the protection of the bilateral
investment by not considering it a covered "investment" in the first place.
The violations of Article 10 (failure to disclose required information),
Article 11 (failure to comply with tax obligations), and Article 12 (failure
to comply with host state laws, including minimum wage requirements)
have a similar effect of denial of protection. This proposal was draconian
even by the contemporary standards that counsel caution. For example,
consider the application of Article 12:
175. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at pmbl.
176. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 1.6.
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12.1 Investors and their Investments shall be subject to and comply with
the Law of the Host State. This includes, but is not limited to, the
following: (i) Law concerning payment of wages and minimum wages,
employment of contract labour, prohibition on child labour, special
conditions of work, social security and benefit and insurance schemes
applicable to employees; (ii) information sharing requirements of the
Host State concerning the Investment in question and the corporate
history and practices of the Investment or Investor, for purposes of
decision making in relation to that Investment or for other purposes;
(iii) environmental Law applicable to the Investment and its business
operations; (iv) Law relating to conservation of natural resources; (v)
Law relating to human rights; (vi) Law of consumer protection and fair
competition; and (vii) relevant national and internationally accepted
standards of corporate governance and accounting practices.
Read in conjunction with the Draft Text's definition of investment, any
violation of this provision would deny protection by excluding whatever
capital is invested from the definition of "investment." This could cover
any failure to comply with "law[s] relating to human rights" or "relevant
national and internationally accepted standards of corporate governance
and accounting practices." In practical terms, this would mean that an
alleged violation of any one of these provisions would have to be litigated
to determine whether there is a protected investment in the first place.
This very unusual provision would have likely generated more-not
fewer--disputes. In any case, the Final BIT Model omitted all the cross-
references to the other provisions that conditioned meaning on
compliance with other requirements. It defines "investment" simply as:
[A]n enterprise constituted, organised and operated in good faith by an
investor in accordance with the law of the Party in whose territory the
investment is made, taken together with the assets of the enterprise, has
the characteristics of an investment such as the commitment of capital
or other resources, certain duration, the expectation of gain or profit, the
assumption of risk and a significance for the development of the Party
in whose territory the investment is made.177
This is a classic adaptation of what is commonly referred to as the
Salini test1 7 8 for investment that requires territorial nexus, some level of
permanency, and contribution to the host state.
177. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 1.4.
178. Salini et. al. (Italy) v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, T 16 (July 23, 2001), 42 1.L.M. 609 (2003). This case attempted to formulate what
looks like a set of common definitional criteria and introduced the elements of putting capital at
risk for a certain duration and contribution to the development of the host state. Id. at 1 52. See
generally Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the
Domain ofInternational Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 269-76 (2010) (discussing the
difficulty of defining "investment").
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A related concept that both the Draft Text and the Final Model define
is "investor." The Draft text defines "an investor" as: "(i) A legal entity
constituted, organized and operated in compliance with the Law of the
Home State, owned or controlled by a Natural Person or a legal entity of
the Home State and conducting real and substantial business operations
in the Home State."l79 The Final BIT Model omitted "real" but
maintained "and substantial business operations," adding indirect
ownership.'80 This is another example of retraction in the face of
pressure.
ii. Treatment of Investment
The Draft BIT Text formulated standards of treatment differently. The
most unusual provision is the first provision on the standard of treatment.
It expressly states that the parties agree to avoid the "denial of jiftstice
under customary international law." Having expressly incorporated
customary international law on denial of justice as a rule of decision, it
tightens the standards on violations of due process and abusive treatment
by adding adjectives uch as "egregious" for violations and "manifestly"
for abuse.181 It subjects "denial of justice" to customary international law
and adds stricter standards for violations and abuse. This appears almost
meaningless because by so doing the Draft Text necessarily incorporates
the "denial of justice" doctrine and jurisprudence developed over the last
half-century by reference and renders the other stricter provisions
redundant. That is because an investor who cannot demonstrate an
"egregious violation" or "manifestly abusive" host-state behavior could
still prove a denial of justice under customary international law. Indeed,
179. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 1.9.
180. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art 1.5:
"Investor" means a natural or juridical person of a Party, other than a branch or
representative office, that has made an investment in the territory of the other Party; For
the purposes of this definition, a "juridical person" means:
(a) a legal entity that is constituted, organized and operated under the law of that
Party and that has substantial business activities in the territory of that Party; or (b)
a legal entity that is constituted, organized and operated under the laws of that Party
and that is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a natural person of that
Party or by a legal entity mentioned under sub clause (a) herein.
Id. (emphasis added).
181. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 3:
Standard of Treatment 3.1 Each Party shall not subject Investments of Investors of the
other Party to Measures which constitute: (i) Denial of justice under customary
international law (ii) Un-remedied and egregious violations of due process; or; (iii)
Manifestly abusive treatment involving continuous, unjustified and outrageous coercion
or harassment. 3.2 A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of
this Treaty, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has
been a breach of this Article. Id.
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there would be no point for the investor to even attempt to show
egregiousness or manifest abuse to the extent that these standards are not
required by customary international law.1 82 This is an example of the
drafter's dilemma in trying to stay within the acceptable limits of
international law while addressing the fear of abuse that India believed it
had experienced.
The Final BIT Model Text somewhat remedies this unclear
formulation by stating the principle more clearly as follows:
No Party shall subject investments made by investors of the other Party
to measures which constitute a violation of customary international law
through: (i) Denial of justice in any judicial or administrative
proceedings; or (ii) fundamental breach of due process; or (iii) targeted
discrimination on manifestly unjustified grounds, such as gender, race
or religious belief; or (iv) manifestly abusive treatment, such as
coercion, duress and harassment.183
Unlike the Draft Text, the BIT Model Text formulates a unitary test of
whether the alleged act or omission violates customary international law
through one of the enumerated grounds, such as denial of justice,
violation of due process, discrimination, abuse, or duress-concepts that
it tightens by adding qualifiers such as "targeted" and "manifestly."
Both the Draft BIT Text and the Final BIT Model Text eliminate the
Most Favored Nation Treatment ("MFN") standard altogether but keep
the National Treatment ("NT") standard. The Draft BIT Text does so in
a profusely disturbed manner.184 The elimination of the MFN provision
is not surprising given the brutally creative way that tribunals have used
MFN to important all sorts of investor benefits into bilateral investment
treaties, including dispute settlement provisions as discussed in the White
Industries case in Section II above. But certain additions to the NT
standard in the Draft BIT Text rendered it inept. Two additions support
this conclusion. The first is the addition of direct intent to harm or
willfulness of the denial of benefits, and the second is the exemption of
decisions of local authorities.185 This was also clearly a reaction to India's
182. See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press
2005) (addressing the concept of denial of justice under human rights and investment reaties in
great detail).
183. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 3.1.
184. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 4 (contrasting reasons for keeping the National
Treatment standard).
185. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 4:
4.1. Each Party shall not apply to Investments, Measures that accord less favourable
treatment than that it accords, in like circumstances, to domestic investments with
respect to ...
4.2 A breach of Article 4.1 will only occur if the challenged Measure constitutes
intentional and unlawful discrimination against the Investment on the basis of nationality
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experience with arbitral tribunals interpreting the national treatment
provisions of the previous model.
The BIT Model Text remedies some of these problems. It provides the
following:
4.1 Each Party shall not apply to investor or to investments made by
investors of the other Party, measures that accord less favourable
treatment than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
or to investments by such investors with respect to the management,
conduct, operation, sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.
4.2 The treatment accorded by a Party under Article 4.1 means, with
respect to a Sub-national government, treatment no less favourable than
the treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that Sub-national
government to investors, and to investments of investors, of the Party
of which it forms a part.186
The Final BIT Model Text eliminates the requirement of intentionality
and willfulness and moderates the exemption of local authorities by
simply providing that they should treat foreign investors the same way
that they treat investors from other localities of India-a modified most
favored treatment within the same country. In practical terms, it would
mean that an investor from Australia in Kolkata must be treated the same
way as one from Bangalore. This is a reasonable compromise that
respects the autonomy of the local authorities while at the same time
eliminating the potential inconsistencies and even capriciousness that
unlimited local powers in the Draft BIT Text might have invited.
iii. Expropriation and Compensation
The Draft BIT Text's expropriation provision also unusually modifies
the standard formulation in most investment treaties by adding numerous
unusual provisions. This appears to be an overreaction due to India's
unfavorable experience with arbitral interpretation of the expropriation
provision in the UK Model that it adopted three decades prior.187
to domestic investments with respect to the management, conduct, operation, sale or
other disposition of Investments in its territory.
4.3 This Article shall not apply to any Law or Measure of a Regional or local
Government. Id.
186. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 4.
187. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5:
5.1 Neither Party may nationalize or expropriate an Investment (hereinafter
"expropriate"), or take Measures having an effect equivalent to expropriation, except for
reasons of public purpose.
5.2 The determination of whether a Measure or a series of Measures have an effect
equivalent to expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry, and usually
requires evidence that there has been: in accordance with the procedure established by
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The most important change from the UK Model pertained to the
allocation of jurisdiction or competence for the determination of whether
any taking is for public purpose. The Draft BIT Text assigned such
authority exclusively to the Indian courts. It made that choice clear in at
least two provisions. In the first one, it adds a footnote to the standard
provision which reads: "Neither Party may nationalize or expropriate an
Investment (hereinafter "expropriate"), or take Measures having an effect
equivalent to expropriation, except for reasons of public purpose in
accordance with the procedure established by Law, and on payment of
adequate compensation."88 Although this is not the exact language of the
Hull Formula, as it omitted "effective and prompt," it is nonetheless not
an uncommon formulation. The addition that made it somewhat unusual
was the inclusion of a footnote on "public purpose," which reads:
For the avoidance of doubt, where India is the expropriating Party, any
Measure of expropriation relating to land shall be for the purposes as
set out in its Law relating to land acquisition and any questions as to
"public purpose" and compensation shall be determined in accordance
with the procedure specified in such Law. 189
Another provision made it clear that the decision regarding whether an
expropriation was for public purpose was to be made by the Indian
courts-not by arbitral tribunals.190
This is remarkably similar to the old Chinese model discussed in
Section I that restricted arbitration to the quantum of damages. It is
interesting to see that while China moved away from that approach, India
wanted to move in that direction decades later. It is without a doubt a
reflection of the countries' respective experiences with investment
Law, and on payment of adequate compensation.
(i) permanent and complete or near complete deprivation of the value of
Investment; and
(ii) permanent and complete or near complete deprivation of the Investor's right of
management and control over the Investment, (iii) an appropriation of the
Investment by the Host State which results in transfer of the complete or near
complete value of the Investment to that Party or to an agency or instrumentality of
the Party or a third party; and
5.3 For the avoidance of doubt, the Parties agree that an action taken by a Party in its
commercial capacity shall not constitute expropriation or any other measure having
similar effect.
5.4 For the avoidance of doubt, the parties also agree that, non-discriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives such as public health, safety and the environment shall not constitute
expropriation. Id.
188. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5.1.
189. Id. at art. 5.1 n.3.
190. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5.5 (articulating that decisionmaking lies with
Indian courts).
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arbitration. As indicated above, China seems to have fared better in all
respects by avoiding the kind of adverse experience that India has
endured with investment arbitration. Moreover, the Draft BIT Text did
not leave total discretion to arbitral tribunals regarding the assessment of
the quantum of damages. Rather, it set forth detailed provisions
discussing what factors the tribunal must consider in its assessment of
damages.19 1 This was another reflection of India's distrust of arbitral
decisionmaking.
A commentary on this approach is offered under Section E below;
however, it is important to note that the Final BIT Model Text made
substantial changes to the initial formulation, which was a better indicator
of India's frustration and what exactly India wanted to do. The
compromise Final BIT Model Text reads as follows:
5.1 Neither Party may nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
investor (hereinafter "expropriate") of the other Party either directly or
191. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at arts. 5.6.-5.8:
5.6 Compensation provided under this Article shall be adequate and reflect the fair
market value of the expropriated Investment, as reduced after application of relevant
mitigating Factors. The amount of compensation shall not vary based on whether an
expropriation has complied with the criteria of Article 5.1.
5.7 Mitigating Factors under Article 5.6 include:
(a) current and past use of the Investment, including the history of its acquisition
and purpose; (b) the duration of the Investment and previous profits made by the
Investment; (c) compensation or insurance payouts received by the Investor or
Investment from other sources; (d) the value of property that remains subject to the
Investor or Investment's disposition or control, (e) options available to the Investor
or Investment to mitigate its losses, including reasonable efforts made by the
Investor or Investor towards such mitigation, if any; (f) conduct of the Investor that
contributed to its damage; (g) any obligation the Investor or its Investment is
relieved of due to the expropriation[;] (h)[ ]liabilities owed in the Host State to the
government as a result of the Investment's activities[;] (i) any harm or damage that
the Investor or its Investment has caused to the environment or local community
that have not been remedied by the Investor or the Investment[;] and (j) any other
relevant considerations regarding the need to balance the public interest and the
interests of the Investment.
5.8 Any payment of compensation shall be made in a freely convertible currency. Interest
on payment of compensation, if any, shall be paid in simple interest at the LIBOR rate
from the date of expropriation until the date of actual payment. On payment,
compensation shall be freely transferable in accordance with Article 6.
In addition to the detailed guidance on the assessment of damages, the Draft BIT Text adds the
following two "Explanations":
Explanation I: The computation of the fair market value of the property shall exclude
any consequential or exemplary losses or speculative or windfall profits claimed by the
Investor, including those relating to moral damages or loss of goodwill.
Explanation II: The valuation date for computation of compensation shall be the day
immediately before the expropriation takes place. In no event the valuation date shall be
moved to any future date.
Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art 5.7.
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through measures having an effect equivalent to expropriation, except
for reasons of public purpose [footnote omitted], in accordance with the
due process of law and on payment of adequate compensation. Such
compensation shall be adequate and be at least equivalent o the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately on the day
before the expropriation takes place ("date of expropriation'), and
shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended
expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall
include going concern value, asset value including declared tax value
of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine
fair market value. 1 92
The expropriation provision of the Final BIT Model Text
demonstrably shifted in significant ways from the Draft Model Text. The
first important change pertains to the allocation of jurisdiction to decide
whether the taking is for public purpose. This is basically jurisdiction to
decide on the lawfulness or legality of the expropriation itself. The Draft
BIT Text, as indicated above, granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Indian
courts.1 9 3 The Final BIT Model changed it in the following way:
5.6 In considering an alleged breach of this Article, a Tribunal shall
take account of whether the investor or, as appropriate, the locally-
established enterprise, pursued action for remedies before domestic
courts or tribunals prior to initiating a claim under this Treaty.194
The Draft Text's grant of jurisdiction to the Indian courts to decide the
lawfulness of the expropriation was changed to the above formulation,
according to which an arbitral tribunal, in determining the lawfulness of
the expropriation, must take account of judicial proceedings that might
have preceded the arbitration. Although this might appear to constrain the
tribunal's jurisdiction, in essence, the Final BIT Model Text, unlike the
Draft BIT Text, preserves the arbitrability of the lawfulness of the
expropriation. Although the difference that it makes on the quantum of
damages is a difficult question and may require a case-by-case
192. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5.1 (emphasis added).
193. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5.5. The most pertinent provision of the Draft BIT
Text is 5.5. It reads:
If an Investor alleges that its Investment:- [sic] (a) has been expropriated, (b) payment
of compensation has not been awarded, or (c) payment of compensation awarded is not
adequate in violation of Article 5.1, it may submit a claim for determination of those
issues and an award of adequate compensation pursuant to and in accordance with the
terms of Article 14. However, a tribunal constituted under Article 14 or 15 shall not
have authority to review the Host State's determination ofwhether a Measure was taken
for a public purpose or in compliance with its Law." Id. (emphasis added).
194. Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5.6 (emphasis added). The BIT Model Text does,
however, exempt land-takings cases from arbitral decisionmaking. Model BIT Text, supra note 67,
at n.3. This rule remained unchanged from the Draft BIT Text. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67,
at n.4 (outlining the responsibilities of tribunals).
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analysis,195 it saves India from the embarrassment of going back to an era
that China abandoned decades ago without any adverse consequences.
The other important change in the Final BIT Model Text pertains to
the assessment of damages. While the Draft BIT Text focused on
mitigating factors, the Final BIT Model Text, consistent with standard
BIT language, emphasizes the computation of fair market value as of the
time the measure of expropriation became public knowledge.196
D. Investor and Home State Obligations
The Draft BIT Text was also unusual in adding elaborate provisions
on home state and investor obligations. These investor obligations
included compliance with anti-corruption lawsl97 and disclosure of
information about the investor and its investments, including the sources
of its finances,198 labor and employment laws,199 and environmental,
human rights, and tax laws.200 As intriguing as the inclusion of these
provisions in a bilateral investment treaty might have seemed, what was
quite remarkable was the linkage that the Draft BIT Text made between
the violation of any of these provisions and the definition of investment
discussed in Section III above. Any violation of any of these obligations
would essentially have made the protections under any bilateral
investment treaty modeled after this Draft BIT Text inapplicable.
195. The question of whether, if at all, and how, the unlawfulness of the expropriation would
affect the quantum of damages is a subject of controversy in "international arbitral jurisprudence"
to the extent such a corpus exists. Notable demonstrations are the three Libyan Oil cases of the
1970s in which opinion was split on whether and how a finding of unlawfulness of the expropriation
affects the quantum of damages. The three cases are: British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 INT'L L. REP. 297 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. 1973); Libya
American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1 (ICC Int'l
Ct. Arb. 1977); Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 55
INT'L L. REP. 354 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. 1975) (consolidated with the case of California Asiatic Oil
Company (CALASIATIC)). For a summary of these cases, see KIDANE, CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, supra note 13, at 126-29. For a fuller discussion see generally Robert Von Mehren
& Nicholas P. Kourides, International Arbitration between States and Private Parties: The Libyan
Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1981).
196. See Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 5.1 (discussing the process for determining the
valuation criteria in the event of expropriation).
197. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 9 (discussing the investor obligations against
corruption).
198. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 10 (discussing financial disclosure requirements
the investor must make to the host state).
199. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 12 (stating the investor's responsibility and the
manner in which their investments must be subject to and comply with labor and employment laws,
disclosure requirements as a matter of due diligence, environmental law, human rights law,
consumer law, standards of corporate governance and accounting practices, and general
contribution to the development objectives of the host state).
200. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 11 (stating the investor's responsibility to comply
with the host state's law on taxes, the environment, and human rights).
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Unsatisfied with all of these changes, in the Draft BIT Text India sought
access to the home state's judicial process to hold the investor
accountable for actions and omissions in the home state, presumably with
effect in the host state.201
The Final BIT Model Text departed from this unusual formulation by
eliminating all but two provisions in modified form. The two provisions
relate to compliance with laws and corporate social responsibility. The
"compliance with law" provision, in addition to the basic compliance
with all laws and regulations of the host state requirement, incorporates
the anti-corruption and tax liabilities rules of the Draft.202 Anti-
corruption rules are usually matters of independent or criminal statutes
and are rarely, if at all, found in BITs. As indicated in various sections of
this Article, BITs are fundamentally perceived as instruments for the
protection of investors against arbitrary or unlawful host government
actions, not as means of holding unscrupulous investors responsible. The
latter is often considered a matter for domestic laws. India's frustration
with arbitral decisions that appeared to excuse reckless risk-taking or
even illegal investor behavior might have prompted the inclusion of this
provision to give notice to future investors and prescribe rules for arbitral
tribunals to hold investors liable for violations of law in the same forum
as the arbitration of other claims.
The Final BIT Model Text maintains a considerably weakened and
permissive provision on corporate social responsibility. It states:
Investors and their enterprises operating within its territory of each
Party shall endeavour to voluntarily incorporate internationally
recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their practices
and internal policies, such as statements of principle that have been
endorsed or are supported by the Parties. These principles may address
201. Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 13. Although the purpose of this provision is clearly
to allow the State of India to sue the investor in its home state, for jurisdictional purposes, the
provision is not clear about who must do what and where for courts of the host state to have
jurisdiction and for the State of India to have standing. The exact wording of the provision is as
follows:
13.1 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Courts located in the Host State,
Investors and its Investments shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial
process of their Home State for the acts, decisions or omissions made in the Home State
in relation to the Investment where such acts, decisions or omissions lead to significant
damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the Host State.
13.2 The Home State shall ensure that their legal systems and rules allow for, or do not
prevent or unduly restrict, the bringing of court actions on their merits before their
domestic courts relating to the civil liability of Investors and Investments for damages
resulting from alleged acts, decisions or omissions made by Investments or Investors in
relation to their Investments in the territory of the Host State. Id.
202. See Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 11 (stating the investor's responsibility and
requirement that investments comply with the host state's tax law).
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issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, community
relations and anti-corruption.203
The Draft BIT Text would have redefined the basic premise of BITs
by incorporating some serious legal responsibilities of investors,
subjecting them to claims and counterclaims, which in turn would have
given BITs a degree of mutuality. Although it is clear that India showed
interest in redefining the essence of the investor-state relationship in the
Draft BIT Text, it appears that it could not withstand the pressure from
its economic partners to herald a significant departure. It is also possible
that India's decision to cut back on social responsibility and
counterclaims provisions of the Draft might have been influenced by its
own growing status as a capital-exporting state with its own entities
investing in other developing countries in Africa and elsewhere. In any
case, no matter whether India made those changes because of pressure
from its Northern investors or pressure by its own multinational
corporations investing abroad, India has finally chosen the status quo.
E. Investor-State Dispute Settlement ("ISDS")
The main reason India wanted to rewrite the BIT Model it had used for
decades is because of its dissatisfaction with its many arbitral encounters.
The various arbitral decisions, discussed in Section II, interpreted
substantive rules contained in the 1994 BIT Model in ways that India did
not appreciate. It must have felt that it could partially remedy the problem
by redefining doctrine. Realizing that redefining substantive rules alone
would not redress its grievances, it also sought to significantly restructure
the dispute settlement provisions.
The Draft BIT Text's dispute settlement provision contained many
notable features. First, it prohibited the use or threat of arbitration to
demand monetary or other types of gains.204 Developing countries often
dread arbitration, and it is commonly understood that some investors
threaten arbitration to gain certain concessions, but India is perhaps the
first to attempt to prohibit the threat of arbitration in a treaty. The Draft
BIT Text did not provide details of what exactly was prohibited, but it
charts the basic premise nonetheless.
203. See Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 12 (describing the ways in which investors and
their investments must comply with the laws of the host state).
204. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.1:
Without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under Article 15, this
Article establishes a mechanism for the settlement of Investment Disputes. An Investor
shall not use or threaten to use this Article in order to obtain money, property, or any
other thing of value from the Host State, or otherwise compel the Host State to act or
refrain from acting.
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The other important characteristics in the Draft were the requirements
of exhaustion of domestic judicial remedies or showing of futility after
"diligent" pursuit,205 as well as complying with strict temporal
limitations.206 Once the exhaustion hurdle had been passed, the Draft BIT
Text set forth detailed provisions on the submission of the claim for
arbitration and the constitution of the tribunal. The process is nothing
remarkable. Each side appointed one arbitrator and the two selected the
chair. It accords the default appointment authority to the Secretary
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA"), but if he or she
happens to be a national of one of the parties, appointment authority is
given to the President of the International Court of Justice, the Vice
President, or the next most senior judge, in that order.207 The
qualifications were also limited to expertise, impartiality, and
independence, about which the Draft Text added elaborate provisions.208
Interestingly, the Draft BIT Text called for ICSID arbitration, if both
parties were members, and ICSID Additional Facility, if only one party
was a member. But more realistically, because India is not a member of
ICSID, it adopted the UNCITRAL Rules and permitted the parties to
agree on a seat, failing which it gave the tribunal the authority to decide
the seat with preference given to a seat in the host country. 209 The lack of
a definitive selection of the seat in the host country is surprising given all
the precautionary measures that the Draft Text seems to adopt.
The transparency provision in the Draft BIT Text was robust, allowing
the disclosure of all the pleadings and hearing transcripts with few
limitations authorized by law.210 Other notable provisions include
205. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.3 (stating that the investor must exhaust
domestic remedies through the host state before attempting other remedies, and setting forth the
specific requirements that must be met prior to commencing a proceeding under Article 14.3 by
transmitting a Notice of Dispute to the Respondent Party).
206. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.4 (discussing timeline limitations for
submitting a claim to arbitration).
207. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.5 (discussing the composition and manner in
which arbitrators are appointed to the tribunal, and specifically noting the order of appointing
authority in the event a tribunal has not been appointed within 120 days from the date a claim was
submitted for arbitration).
208. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.6 (detailing the initial procedure and
challenges of the prevention of a conflict of interest of arbitrators, in addition to the ongoing
protocol of disclosure and party challenges to an arbitrator's alleged impartiality).
209. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.7 (stating arbitrations shall be conducted under
the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; agreement
on seat and location of arbitration and consideration given in the event of disagreement; tribunal
decisions on preliminary question of objections by Respondent Parties; and production of
documents and evidence).
210. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.8 (addressing transparency in arbitral
proceedings regarding document disclosure, oral arguments, award of a tribunal, and non-disputing
party oral and written submissions).
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counterclaims and costs. While the Draft Text permitted counterclaims
by the respondent state for violations of investor responsibilities,2 11 it
required, as a default rule, that each party bear its own costs while giving
the tribunal the discretion to reallocate costs on a case-by-case basis.212
Given some of the other changes the Draft BIT Text made that are
emblematic of India's discomfort and suspicion toward the arbitral
process, the decision to have the parties bear their own costs as a matter
of general rule was urprising.
Although the Final BIT Model Text maintains most of the provisions
of the Draft Text on dispute settlement, including the exhaustion
requirements, it makes certain important modifications. First, it
eliminates the counterclaims provision that would have allowed the host
state to proceed against the investor for violations of the investor's
responsibilities in such areas as corruption, taxation, disclosure, and
general compliance with the laws of the host state.213 The elimination is
not surprising in light of the minimization of investor responsibilities in
the Final BIT Model Text. This again could be due to a realization of the
technical difficulties surrounding investor consent in investment treaties,
or the realization of India's changing role as a significant investor abroad.
The second important modification is the addition of a provision for
the dismissal of frivolous claims. Although India is wearing its recipient-
of-FDI hat on this matter, it is nonetheless a very important provision. It
mandates that tribunals decide jurisdictional questions first, as well as
identify frivolous claims and dismiss them as expeditiously as possible.
The relevant provision reads in part:
21.1 Without prejudice to a Tribunal's authority to address other
objections, a Tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary
question any objection by the Defending Party that a claim submitted
by the investor is: (a) not within the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction,
or (b) manifestly without legal merit or unfounded as a matter of law.214
211. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.11 (discussing the matters that give rise to
counterclaims, which are violations of art. 9 (obligations against corruption), art. 10 (disclosure),
art. 11 (taxation), and art. 12 (compliance with laws of host state) of Chapter Ill).
212. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.12 (stating that both parties shall share the
costs of arbitration, with arbitrator fees, expenses allowances and other administrative costs, in
which each party is responsible for its own costs related to arbitral representation costs; however,
the tribunal has discretion to shift costs by either requiring one party to pay a higher proportion or
the entire cost of proceedings, and may even award all costs in addition to damages in favor of the
respondent).
213. See Draft BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 14.11 (stating the conditions under which a party
can initiate a counterclaim against the investor and the resulting monetary assessment for
appropriate compensation).
214. See Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 21.1 (explaining the ability both parties have to
request consultations on any issue regarding interpretation, application, implementation, execution
or another matters contained therein).
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This provision avoids a common problem of merging jurisdictional
decisions with the merits,215 which prolongs the process and structurally
increases costs. It also discourages frivolous claims by denying the
opportunity to use the threat of arbitration to extract concessions outside
of the arbitral process.
By far the most interesting addition of the Final BIT Model Text is the
inclusion of the possibility of establishing an appellate mechanism.
Although it is, as of yet, just a placeholder and at best aspirational, it is
an indication of the recognition of the new trend toward institutional
discipline. It provides:
The Parties may by agreement or after the completion of their respective
procedures regarding the enforcement of this Treaty may establish an
institutional mechanism to develop an appellate body or similar
mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under this chapter.
Such appellate body or similar mechanism may be designed to provide
coherence to the interpretation of provisions in this Treaty.216
Although it is interesting and certainly trendy, its utility for the purpose
for which it is conceived is doubtful in a bilateral setting. The trending
appellate mechanism in international investment law is to bring order and
coherence and ensure accountability. Most of the proposals are in
multilateral settings, such as the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific
arrangements. To make economic sense, the anticipated bilateral
relationship has to be expected to generate at least a handful of disputes
between the parties covered under the bilateral arrangement. The
statistics of the disputes that India has been involved in so far do not show
that there is a problem of inconsistent jurisprudence as between the same
two parties covered by the same treaty. The incoherence that exists in the
application of many bilateral treaties cannot be remedied by an appellate
mechanism established by a bilateral treaty. In that sense, the BIT Model
Text's inclusion of the possibility of a bilateral appellate mechanism is
unlikely to be a meaningful solution to India's suspicion of arbitral
decisionmaking. If the parties are willing to travel that route, the BIT
215. See WON L. KIDANE, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 43-61 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2017) (providing a good example of tribunals' tendency to merge jurisdictional
decisions with the consideration of the merits of the claim in the Salini v. Ethiopia case).
216. See Model BIT Text, supra note 67, at art. 29:
In developing such a mechanism, the Parties may take into account the following issues,
among others: a) the nature and composition of an appellate body or similar mechanism;
b) the scope and standard of review of such an appellate body; c) transparency of
proceedings of the appellate body; d) the effect of decisions by an appellate body or
similar mechanism; e) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar
mechanism to the arbitral rules that may be selected under Articles 20.1 of this Treaty;
and f) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar mechanism to existing
domestic laws and international law on the enforcement of arbitral awards.
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could have easily provided for ad hoc bilateral first-instance and appellate
court systems populated by bilateral state-appointed ad hoc judges on a
case-by-case basis. India's problem, as will be elaborated in the
conclusion below, is its misidentification of the problem. The main
problem is not the substantive rules or the procedures; it is the limited
pool of arbitrators plagued by conflicts of interest, ideological bias,
favoritism, secrecy, and condescension, just to name a few.217 Any
modification that does not address the main problem will not bring the
kind of comfort India seeks.
F. Conclusion
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that, unlike China, India has
not been systematic, intentional, or coherent in its BIT program,2 18 which
could be partially blamed for the disappointing scorecard of the number
of cases that it had to arbitrate and/or settle. The questions that need to be
asked now are: Will the BIT Model Text remedy India's ISDS problems?
What does it mean for India's relations with the North? How about with
the South?
The newly released BIT Model Text makes significant changes both
to the substantive and the procedural rules of the model that India used
since it signed its first BIT with the UK in 1994. Its disappointment with
numerous investor-state cases over the years prompted its decision to
renegotiate its existing BITs and use a new model for future BITs.
It appears that the Draft BIT Text was an extreme form of over-
reaction to the traumatic experience of having the essence of its sovereign
functions questioned, including the soundness of its judiciary all the way
up to its Supreme Court. India rolled back some of the extreme provisions
contained in the Draft BIT Model Text, but whether India will succeed in
convincing other states to agree to some variation of this model-and if
so, whether this new Model will remedy India's real and perceived
problems with the previous UK model that it utilized-remains to be
seen. However, a few observations can be made from the outset. First, it
217. See generally KIDANE, supra note 215 (providing a more systematic discussion of these
issues).
218. See Hanessian & Duggal, supra note 169, at 217 (quoting Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of
India's New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 71 (Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge eds., Both
Ends, Madhyam and Somo (2016)) ("[N]egotiations on investment chapters of FTAs were handled
[by] the Ministry of Commerce while standalone BITs were negotiated by the Ministry of Finance.
This indeed is a welcome development as there have been several instances of differences on
investment issues between these two ministries resulting in a lack of policy coherence.") For
example, even within the Indian government, it appears the two different agencies-one
responsible for the BIT program and another responsible for investment provisions in trade
agreements followed inconsistent paths. Id.
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appears that the BIT Model Text treats the wrong patient. That is a strong
statement, but the underlying reason is the fundamental assumption that
the BIT Model Text makes about why India suffered the consequences of
its previous model. It assumes that the substantive provisions and the
arbitral procedures were to blame for its disappointing experiences on the
arbitral front. It further assumes that changing the principles and
burdening the arbitral process with temporal and exhaustion requirements
will ease or eliminate the problem of unfair, unjust, or even biased
outcomes. Those are not completely correct assumptions.
Consider, for example, what the Tribunal did in the White Industries
case,219 discussed in Section II above. Although the dispute was between
India and an Australian investor, and the India-Australia BIT did not
contain the concept of "effective means of asserting"220 and "enforcing"
claims,22 1 as discussed in Section II, that did not prevent the Tribunal
from importing this standard from the India-Kuwait BIT through the
MFN provision contained in the Australia-India BIT. 222 The White
Industries Tribunal found a creative way to hold India liable for
violations of a principle that India did not include in its BIT with
Australia.223 It is possible, and indeed quite likely, that a tribunal
composed slightly differently (say, a majority from developing countries)
could have avoided this kind of legal virtuosity to justify a particular
desired outcome. That is to say, principles are what people who interpret
them say they are. In essence, the exact formulations of the principles are
less important than the people who interpret them. The most serious
problem with the ISDS that India has suffered is less about the principles
than about the people who interpreted them. India's new Model BIT
changes the principles but changes nothing about the pool of people who
will interpret them. That is why the Model is treating the wrong patient.
The simple solution would have been to make rules regarding who should
serve as an arbitrator.
The rules that he BIT Model Text contains are a rehashing of the most
obvious impartiality and independence principles, but those are not
219. Investment Policy Hub, White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/378 (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
220. In the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration in Singapore under the Agreement between
white Industries Australia Limited and The Republic of India, Final Award, ¶ 11 (Nov. 30, 2011)
(discussing an effective means of asserting claims in the India-Australia BIT in which a reference
to the India-Kuwait BIT is made).
221. See id. at ¶ 11.4.4 (analyzing the enforcement proceedings in terms of the history of these
proceedings and the practice of "enforcing" separately).
222. See id. at ¶ 11.1.1 (stating that Art. 4(2) of the India-Australia BIT contains the MFN
clause); see also id. at ¶11.1.4 (stating that the India-Kuwait BIT at art. 4(5) contains the "effective
means of asserting and enforcing rights" standard).
223. See id. at T 11.4.5 (describing the procedural history of the case as "less than ideal").
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sufficient. A meaningful rule should go to the heart of the problem. It
should disrupt the monopoly build on pretention. It may appear difficult,
but all it takes is recognition that there is no reason why a select few
arbitrators who are mostly ideologically biased against developing
countries sit in judgment of the quality of the judicial systems and other
rules and institutions of developing countries. For example, there is no
reason why, in a dispute between India and Australia, the majority of the
arbitrators should be Western. A simple solution would be to seek fair
representation on investment tribunals and even demand a majority from
developing countries. This might be a provocative solution, but there is
no reason why the BIT cannot make that a condition in a reciprocal way;
i.e., if the respondent state is a developing country, the majority of the
arbitrators should be from developing countries, and if the respondent
state is a developed country, the majority of the arbitrators should be from
developed countries, or any variation of such formulation to avoid the
kind of ideological and other types of biases that host states often suffer
by being forced to choose from a limited pool of arbitrators.224
Redefining principles alone does not prevent the theoretical sophistry of
the type seen in White Industries. No matter what the principles say and
what the facts appear to be, skilled and sophisticated arbitrators can
plausibly justify their preferred outcome. This is the most serious
problem that makes most developing countries dread international
arbitration. India's Final BIT Model Text conspicuously does nothing to
aid the representational deficit that plagues international investment
arbitration today.225
IV. CHINA'S AND INDIA'S BIT APPROACHES TOWARD AFRICA
Both China and India are linked with many African countries by a web
of bilateral investment treaties. China has signed BITs with thirty-five
African states, and sixteen of them are in force as of this writing.226
Similarly, India has signed thirteen BITs with African states, out of which
seven are in force.227 China and India have five overlapping BITs that are
224. See generally KIDANE, supra note 215 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the issue
of bias in international arbitral decisionmaking and the need for diversification of the pool).
225. Some useful steps could have been taken to alleviate the representational deficit by, for
example, requiring a certain number of arbitrators from the developing world.
226. See Investment Policy Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator-China,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/llA/CountryBits/42#iialnnerMenu (last visited
Jan. 3, 2018); see generally Won Kidane, China's Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States
in a Comparative Context, 49 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141 (2016) (noting the number of China's BITs
with African nations).
227. See Investment Policy Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator-India,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/LA/CountryBits/96 (last visited Jan. 3, 2018)
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in force with African states. These are BITs with Egypt, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, and Sudan. China and India have many
overlapping BITs with developed countries of the North, including the
UK. The five overlapping African BITs are evaluated in the next section
in light of China's and India's BITs with the UK for comparative context.
A. Substantive Protections
Chinese and Indian BITs with African states are essentially adaptations
of their respective BITs with their traditional partners from the North.
The details are worth exploring, however. This Section first looks at the
substantive provisions, followed by dispute settlement provisions in
comparative context.
i. Investment Protection
The benchmark used here is the China-UK and India-UK BITs.
Temporally, the two BITs are nearly a decade apart, with the China-UK
BIT coming into force on May 15, 1986 (the day it was signed in
London), and the India-UK BIT coming into force on January 6, 1995
(nearly a year after it was signed in London in March 1994).228
The two BITs enshrine the standard investment rules with slightly
differing formulations. Although the definition of "investment" is almost
identical, curiously, the provision in the India-UK BIT on claims to
money under contact qualifies it as "rightful claims." The Chinese BIT
does not contain the term "rightful." The Indian version reads in full:
"rightful claims to money or to any performance under contract having a
financial value."229 This addition would have been more significant if the
dispute settlement provisions contained in these treaties were switched.
That is because under the China-UK treaty, the jurisdiction of arbitral
tribunals is limited to the adjudication of the quantum of damages,
presumably with liability being determined by the local courts.230 The
India-UK BIT permits the arbitration of both liability and quantum. That
(showing India's BITs including the treaties in force: Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Senegal, and Sudan); see also Kidane, China's Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra
note 13 (providing a comparative study of these treaties).
228. India-UK BIT, supra 174; Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China
concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments with Exchange of Notes,
China-UK, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/793 (May 15,
1986) [hereinafter China-UK BIT].
229. Compare China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. (1)(a)(iii) (" ... claims to money or to any
performance under contract having a financial value"), with India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art.
1(b)(iii) (" rightful claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial
value.").
230. See infra Section IV.B (comparing dispute settlement provisions of the China-UK BIT and
the India-UK BIT with Chinese and Indian BITs with four African states).
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means in the latter case, the element of "rightfulness" would have to be
determined by arbitral tribunals. The addition of "rightfulness" would
have made more sense if it were added to the Chinese BIT because of the
bifurcation of jurisdiction.
The provisions on promotion and protection of investment, although
titled exactly the same, contain significantly differing mechanics of
substantive protection. The hierarchy with domestic laws and interactions
with dispute settlement mechanisms are most notable. The distinctions
are also important to compare with the formulations of these rules in the
relevant African BITs discussed later. The China-UK BIT provides:
ARTICLE 2
Promotion and Protection of Investment
(1) Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable
conditions for nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party for
investments in the territory and, subject to its right to exercise powers
conferred by its laws, shall admit such investment.
(2) Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall
enjoy the most constant protection and security in the territory of the
other Contracting Party. Each Contracting Party agrees that without
prejudice to its laws and regulations, it shall not take any unreasonable
or discriminatory measures against the management, maintenance, use,
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of nationals or
companies of the other Contracting Party. Each Contracting Party shall
observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to
investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.231
The corresponding India-UK BIT presents the rule pertaining to
promotion and protection as follows:
ARTICLE 3
Promotion and Protection of Investment
(I) Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable
conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party, to make
investments in its territory, and admit such investments in accordance
with its laws and policy.
(2) Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times
be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection
and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.
(3) Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have
entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other
Contracting Party, provided that dispute resolution under Article 9 of
231. See China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. 2 (outlining the manner in which parties shall
encourage and create favorable conditions for investments and proceed according to fair and
equitable treatment of all parties).
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this Agreement shall only be applicable to this paragraph in the absence
of a normal local judicial remedy being available.232
As these provisions show, the rules on admission are formulated
differently. The China-UK provision explicitly subjects admission to the
local rules, while the India-UK rule seems to focus on admission rather
than the power to exclude. Indeed, it reads: "shall admit ... in accordance
with its laws and policy." Again, the emphasis is on admission, not
exclusion.
The fair-and-equitable-treatment and full-protection-and-security
provisions are laid out in more or less the same language, but the China
BIT adds a non-discrimination rule subject to its own laws that might
permit discrimination and puts emphasis on permanency of the protection
and security by adding "the most constant protection."23 3 Finally, and
interestingly, the Indian BIT denies the arbitrability of claims arising out
of the promotion-and-protection provision unless local judicial remedies
are deemed unavailable, which itself could be a subject of dispute.
While both BITs accord Most Favored Nation ("MFN") 2 34 and
National Treatment ("NT") to each other's investors, the China-UK BIT
qualifies for NT by adding the phrase "to the extent possible."2 35
As already mentioned, China and India have BITs in force with the
same five African states: Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, and
Sudan. Furthermore, China and India also have BITs which have not
come into force as of this writing with six additional African states:
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe.236 Of the
232. India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art. 3. Article 2 of the same treaty makes the treaty
applicable to investments made prior to the coming into force of the treaty. Incidentally, the China-
UK BIT does not contain an equivalent provision.
233. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the
Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, China-Egypt, art. 2(2), UNCTAD (Apr. 21, 1994),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/730 [hereinafter China-Egypt BIT]
(explaining that the phraseology also appears in some other China-Africa BITs, suggesting it is
probably a Chinese formulation).
234. See China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. 3(1-2) (discussing the treatment of investments
by both parties, indicating that each party must not treat the other party less favorably than other
nationals or companies of any third State); see also India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art. 4(1)
(stating that each contracting party must accord treatment to the other party that is not less favorable
than that of its own investors or investors of any third State).
235. See China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. 3(3) ("In addition to the provisions of
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article each Contracting Party shall, to the extent possible, accord
treatment with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to the investments of companies of the
other Contracting Party the same as that accorded nationals or companies.") (emphasis added); see
also India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art. 4(1) (illustrating the absence of the aforementioned
qualification).
236. See Investment Policy Hub, China, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42#iialnnerMenu (last visited Oct. 27,
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five BITs in force, the texts for three are publicly available.237 The
publicly available BITs are China's and India's BITs with Egypt,
Mauritius, and Sudan. Of the six BITs not in force, the text for some are
publicly available, but the BITs with Ghana are selected for this study
because of geographic distribution. Indeed, the China-Ghana BIT is in
force, but the India-Ghana BIT is not.
Beginning with China's and India's individual BITs with Egypt,2 3 8 the
definitions of investment are more or less the same, with some
inconsequential differences such as "claims to money" in the China-
Egypt BIT and "rights to money" in the India-Egypt BIT.2 39
The promotion and protection of investment provisions mimic the
China-UK and India-UK provisions in the China-Egypt BIT and the
India-Egypt BIT discussed above. The respective phraseologies are
"subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws" 24 0 and
"admit such investments in accordance with its laws and policy." 24 1
While the fair and equitable treatment in the India-Egypt BIT is simple
and is exactly the same as the corresponding India-UK BIT provision, the
China-Egypt BIT adds the common Chinese provision of "shall enjoy the
most constant protection and security in the territory of the other
contracting party."242
Two observations could be made here. The first is that the text of the
Indian BIT with Egypt is almost exactly the same as that of the India-UK
BIT. This is not surprising, because India used the same UK model across
the board. The Chinese BIT with Egypt is also almost exactly the same
as the Chinese BIT with the UK. This is also not surprising, because
2017) (providing a list of China's BITs and links to full-text copies where available).
237. The text of the China-Sudan BIT is not available on the UNCTAD website, but it is
available on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
Department of Treaty and Law. Department of Treaty and Law, Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Government of the People's Republic of China
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, (Feb. 5, 2010, 9:44 PM),
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h/aw/201002/20100206778964.html.
238. The China-Egypt BIT came into force on April 1, 1996. Investment Policy Hub, China -
Egypt BIT (1994), UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ILA/country/42/treaty/894
(last visited Oct. 30, 2017). The Egypt-India BIT came into force on November 22, 2000.
Investment Policy Hub, Egypt - India BIT (1997), UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/1353 (last visited Oc . 30, 2017).
See also Agreement between the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government
of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt-India,
terminated Mar. 29, 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1078
[hereinafter Egypt-India BIT].
239. Compare China-Egypt BIT, supra note 233, at art. 1(c), with Egypt-India BIT, supra
note 238, at art. 1(b)(iii) (differentiating between claims to money and rights to money).
240. China-Egypt BIT, supra note 233, at art. 2(1).
241. Egypt-India BIT, supra note 238, at art. 2(1).
242. China-Egypt BIT, supra note 233, at art. 2(2).
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China used its own model across the board. It is clear that while India
seems to have signed the UK model, China pursued its own BIT regime
that appears to have been executed indiscriminately. The indiscriminate
nature of the regime is important to note. As will be shown further below,
the Chinese BITs do not have North-South or South-South variability.
ii. Expropriation and Compensation
The China-UK BIT expropriation provision prohibits both direct and
indirect expropriation of investment, except when it is for "public
purpose ... and against reasonable compensation."243  In terms of
valuation, the rule the BIT adopts is "the real value of the investment
expropriated immediately before the expropriation or the impending
expropriation became public knowledge."244 It also provides that the
compensation must be provided "without undue delay, be effectively
realisable and freely transferable."245
The corresponding India-UK BIT 246 adopts a similar rule with slight
variation on the exact formulation of the rule. Instead of "reasonable
243. China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. 5(1). The entire provision reads as follows:
(1) Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be
expropriated, nationalised or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to
expropriation or nationalisation (hereinafter referred to as "expropriation") in the
territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal
needs of that Contracting Party and against reasonable compensation. Such
compensation shall amount to the real value of the investment expropriated immediately
before the expropriation or impending expropriation became public knowledge, shall
include interest at a normal rate until the date of payment, shall be made without undue
delay, be realisable and be freely transferable. The national or company affected shall
have a right, under the law of the Contracting Party making the expropriation to prompt
review, by a judicial or other independent authority of that Party, of his or its case and
of the valuation of his or its investment in accordance with the principles set out in this
paragraph.
(2) Where a Contracting Party expropriates the assets of a company which is
incorporated or constituted under the law in force in any part of its own territory, and in
which nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party shares, it shall ensure that
the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article are applied to the extent necessary to
guarantee reasonable compensation in respect of investment to such nationals or
companies of the other Contracting Party who are owners of those shares.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art. 5. Sections (1-2), reads as follows:
(1) Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised,
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or
expropriation (hereinafter referred to as "expropriation") in the territory of the other
Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal requirements for
regulating economic activity on a non-discriminatory basis and against fair and equitable
compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the genuine value of the investment
expropriated immediately before the expropriation or before the impending
expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is the earlier, shall include interest
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compensation," it provides for "fair and equitable compensation;" instead
of "fair value," it provides for "genuine value;" and instead of "undue
delay," it provides for "without unreasonable delay."247
The use of terminologies and the general frame of the China-UK and
India-UK BITs allow the conclusion that China used its own version of
expropriation and compensation with African states, but India used the
UK's model in its relations with Africans states. The texts of Chinese
BITs show some minor inconsequential variability, but India's texts are
almost identical.
The China-Egypt BIT adopts the rules on expropriation that are similar
to China's BIT with the UK, but these rules are different from the UK's
BIT with India, as well as India's BIT with the African states under
review. They do, however, employ slightly differing terminology. The
China-UK BIT uses "reasonable compensation ... without undue delay."
Such expression does not appear in the China-Egypt BIT. The latter
simply says, "without unreasonable delay." In terms of valuation, the
China-UK BIT uses the term "real value," while the China-Egypt BIT
uses the term "equivalent to the value of the expropriated
investments."248
The India-Egypt BIT's expropriation provisions essentially mimic the
India-UK BIT's "fair and equitable compensation," "genuine value," and
"without unreasonable delay" formulation. The sequence of the
provisions and the substantive formulation show that the text of the India-
Egypt BIT is almost certainly taken from the India-UK BIT, which came
earlier in time.24 9
The expropriation provisions of the Chinese BITs use similar
terminology, and the Indian BITs also use similar terminology with minor
variations. This can be seen from the China-Mauritius and India-
Mauritius, China-Sudan and India-Sudan, and China-Ghana and India-
Ghana BITs. The texts of the treaties make it clear that China has used its
own text and India has used the UK's text.250 Although there are some
at a fair and equitable rate until the date of payment, shall be made without unreasonable
delay, be effectively realizable and be freely transferable.
(2) The investor affected shall have a right, under the law of the Contracting Party
making the expropriation, to review, by a judicial or other independent authority of that
Party, of his or its case and of the valuation of his or its investment in accordance with
the principles set out in this paragraph. The Contracting Party making the expropriation
shall make every endeavor to ensure that such review is carried out promptly.
247. See id. at art. 5(1) (contrasting formulations of the rule).
248. China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. 5(1); China-Egypt BIT, supra note 233, at art. 4(2).
249. India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art. 5(1); Egypt-India BIT, supra note 238, at art. 4(1).
250. Compare Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the
Government of the People's Republic of China for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, China-Mauritius, May 4, 1996 [hereinafter China-Mauritius BIT], at art. 6, with
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minor variations in the China-Africa BITs, almost all of the India-Africa
BITs have almost identical formulation with the India-UK BIT with
respect to nearly all provisions, including the expropriation provision
under review in this Section.
Perhaps the most important evidence supporting the conclusion that,
while China has used its own model with some variations depending on
which temporal model is applied, India has used the same UK model
without any meaningful variations, is found in the dispute settlement
provisions of the various BITs. This is discussed in the next Section.
B. Dispute Settlement
The most important indicator of the background and generational
status of BITs is the dispute settlement provision. This Section surveys
and compares the dispute settlement provisions of the China-UK and
India-UK BITs with Chinese and Indian BITs with four African states:
Egypt, Mauritius, Ghana, and Sudan.
The China-UK BIT's dispute settlement provision is the Chinese first-
generation BIT, adopted prior to China's membership in ICISD. Its
distinctive feature is the limitation of arbitrability to the quantum of
damages and exclusion of the arbitrability of the merits of the case.25 1
The default rule that the BIT selects is the UNCITRAL Rules,
presumably with all the default appointment provisions.252
The India-UK BIT takes a tiered escalation approach, but when matters
progress from the consensual to the mandatory, it permits the investor to
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the
Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Mauritius, June 20, 2000
[hereinafter India-Mauritius BIT], at art. 6, and Agreement between the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Ghana concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Ghana, Oct. 12, 1989 [hereinafter
China-Ghana BIT], at art. 4, and Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and
the Government of the Republic of Ghana for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, India-Ghana, June 23, 2000 [hereinafter India-Ghana BIT], at art. 5, and Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Government of the People's Republic
of China concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Sudan,
2007 [hereinafter China-Sudan BIT], at art. 4, and Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Sudan for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, India-Sudan, Oct. 22, 2003 [hereinafter India-Sudan BIT], at art. 5.
251. See China-UK BIT, supra note 228, at art. 7 ("(1) A dispute between a national or company
of one Contracting Party and another Contracting Party concerning an amount of compensation
which has not been amicably settled after a period of six months from written notification of that
dispute shall be submitted to international arbitration.").
252. See id. at art. 7(3) ("If after a period of three months the dispute is referred to arbitration
under paragraph (2) above there is no such agreement, the parties to the dispute shall be bound to
submit it to arbitration under the arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law as then in force. The parties to the dispute may agree in writing to modify
these Rules.").
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submit a claim to ICSID, when and if both India and the UK become
members of ICISD, or ICSID Additional Facilities by consent when the
membership requirement is not met. Most importantly, however, if all
else fails, it permits either party to submit the matter to an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal under the UNCITRAL Rules, with the default appointing
authority residing in the office of the president of the International Court
of Justice.25 3 Most notably, the India-UK BIT contains an express
provision on the allocation of cost of the arbitration, as well as
representation. It specifically states that "[e]ach party concerned shall
bear the cost of its own arbitrator and its representation in the arbitral
proceedings." It also requires each party to pay an equal share of the co-
arbitrators' and chair's fees, while leaving some discretion to the tribunal
"to direct that a higher proportion of costs shall be borne by one of the
two parties. .. ." 254
Evidently, China used its own model with African states with
generational modifications, and India used the UK model with African
states without notable modification. Their respective BITs with Egypt,
Mauritius, and Ghana demonstrate this observation.
First, although the China-Egypt BIT was signed in 1994, and the
China-Sudan BIT was signed in 1997, China used the same model, which
only permitted the arbitrability of the quantum of compensation.255
Interestingly, however, the China-Sudan BIT provides for ad hoc
arbitration under the guidance of ICSID rules, with the default
appointment authority given to the ICSID Secretary General.256 The only
change that China made to the dispute settlement provision of its BIT
with the UK was the addition of ICSID rules; it did not, however, go so
far as to use ICSID or ICSID Additional Facilities. This was China's
second-generation BIT.
India, on the other hand, transposed the exact same text of its BIT with
the UK to its BIT with Egypt. The dispute settlement provision remained
almost identical (i.e., if both join ICSID, the dispute shall be referred to
ICSID). If only one is a member of ICSID and both agree, the dispute
shall be referred to ICSID Additional Facility, under which the dispute
shall be referred to an ad hoc arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL
253. See India-UK BIT, supra note 174, at art. 9(1-3) (explaining the tiered escalation
approach).
254. Id. at art. 9(c)(vii).
255. China-Egypt BIT, supra note 233, at art. 9; China-Sudan BIT, supra note 250, at art. 9.
The most notable part in both BITs states: "If a dispute involving the amount of compensation for
expropriation cannot be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as specified in
paragraph 1 of this Article, it may be submitted at the request of either party to an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal."
256. China-Sudan BIT, supra note 250, at art. 9(4).
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Rules, with the ultimate appointing authority given to the "President, the
Vice-President or the next senior judge of the International Court of
Justice."25 7
The China-Mauritius BIT, which was signed in 1996, adopted the
Chinese model that limited arbitration to the quantum of compensation,
with the final appointment authority given to the Chairman of the
International Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce.258
The 1998 India-Mauritius BIT's dispute settlement provision mimics
the India-UK's corresponding provision almost entirely, which begins
with ICSID when both become members, ICSID Additional Facility if
both agree, and then ad hoc under UNCITRAL Rules with appointing
authority given to "the President, the Vice-President or the next senior
judge."259
The 1989 China-Ghana BIT also follows China's model, which limits
arbitrability to the quantum of compensation and grants appointment
authority to the Chairman of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce.260 The China-Sudan BIT's dispute settlement
provision is more or less the same, permittmig arbitration on quantum of
compensation only assigning the appointment authority to the ICSID
Secretary General.261
Yet again, India's BIT with Ghana is a copy of the text of its BIT with
the UK. The dispute settlement provision is almost identical, with the
usual start of referring disputes to ICSID when both become members, to
ICSID Additional Facility if both agree, and then ad hoc arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Rules with appointment authority granted to the
"president, Vice-President or the next senior judge of the International
Court of Justice."262
It is clear, therefore, that although India opened up nearly a decade
later, it was less systematic about it. This is evidenced by its consistent
use of the exact same text for more than a decade with all types of
partners, ranging from the UK to Mauritius. On the other hand, China has
its own model and has pursued it with more intentionality than India.
There is no evidence that either country attempted to use BITs
"offensively" against African states. If anything, neither seems to have
acted on the appreciation of BITs' historic North-South formulation. The
257. See Egypt-India BIT, supra note 238, at art. 8(3)(c)(i) (illustrating the dispute settlement
provision).
258. China-Mauritius BIT, supra note 250, at arts. 13(3) & (5).
259. India-Mauritius BIT, supra note 250, at art. 8(2).
260. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 250, at art. 10(1-2).
261. China-Sudan BIT, supra note 250, at art. 9(4).
262. India-Ghana BIT, supra note 250, at art. 9(3).
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BITs reviewed here show an element of randomness across North-South
and South-South spectrums, and preclude the conclusion that either India
or China contemplated an "offensive" or "defensive" use of BITs.
Be that as it may, however, as by origin, BITs that are of a North-
South, and hence, an "offensive" variety structurally favor the investor
over the host state. That means, to the extent the investment flows from
China to Africa and from India to Africa, the Africans are always on the
receiving end. However, because of India's own experience with BITs-
i.e., at least twenty claims against it in the last decade, as indicated in
Section II, above-it is now seeking to renegotiate everything. It is the
beginning of a new era for BITs and other types of investment treaties.
This time, the prime mover is not China, it is India.
C. Conclusion
The existing evidence does not show that either China or India varied
its BIT content on the basis of the Northern or Southern status of the other
party. India's approach is easily discernable, as it used the same UK
model without any modification. China used different models with
different parties, but its selectivity is merely temporal or generational,
meaning that there is no evidence that it used a particular model for
African countries.
What is also evident is that while China has succeeded in employing
its own model and avoided serious adverse consequences, India is
attempting to do that almost half a century later. Even then, it could not
withstand the pressure. While the Draft BIT Text showcased its real
desire, it settled for a realistic approach. The Final Model BIT Text is by
no means revolutionary.
Undeniably, however, Chinese and Indian investors in Africa benefit
from the inherent structural imbalance built into the fabric of BITs. The
more traditional the BIT, the more beneficial to the investor, not the host
state. Neither China nor India is seriously seeking to fundamentally alter
the very essence of what some call "the law of greed." At the heart of that
hesitation is perhaps the realization that they too are significant investors
in a foreign land. As for Africa, the days of being a passive counterparty
are gone. It has begun to confront its own dilemmas. The recently
unveiled Draft Pan-African Investment Code is one example.263
263. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2016-03), Draft Pan-African
investment code. UN. ECA Committee of Experts (35th: 2016, Mar. 31-Apr. 2: Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia); AU Committee of Experts Meeting (2nd: 2016, Mar. 31-Apr. 2: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia);
UN. ECA Joint Annual Meetings of the African Union Specialized Technical Committee on
Finance, Monetary Affairs, Economic Planning and Integration (9th: 2016, Mar. 31-Apr. 2: Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia). Addis Ababa. C UN.ECA, (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/1 0855/23009/bl 1560526.pdfsequence=1. United
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V. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
International investment law invites the home state of the investor to
police affairs in the host state of the investment. The last time this
happened in modem history, the host state's invitation was not
necessarily voluntary-both in the context of the direct colonial rule that
India endured and the quasi-colonial treatment of extraterritoriality that
China experienced.264 By the time they regained the autonomy to
voluntarily invite investment, China and India had economically fallen so
far behind that their volition was not entirely unconstrained. To attract
capital from more advanced economies, they had to make concessions in
the form of granting certain substantive rights to investors and allowing
decisionmaking by arbitral tribunals outside of their territory by
arbitrators largely from advanced economies; Africa's story is no
different.
As a matter of fact, this system has never sat comfortably with capital-
receiving host developing states anywhere; including, of course, China
and India, which have viewed ISDS with a considerable degree of
suspicion from the very beginning. As stated previously, China avoided
serious disappointments by systematically guarding itself from
jurisdictional intrusion. India has not been as systematic and intentional
as China, and it faced serious disappointments that led to a radical
overcorrection, demonstrated by its recent decision to renounce and
renegotiate its many BITs and its introduction of the BIT Model Text
discussed in Section III, above.
The BITs that China and India have already entered into with African
states examined in Section IV do not demonstrate any discernable pattern
of intention to take advantage of their better economic standing for the
benefit of their investors in Africa. A number of factors might have
contributed to the apparent absence of intentionality. First, neither China
nor India has in its recent history had the experience of being a dominant
power outside of their immediate region-neither was ever a part of the
legal architecture that entrenched the structural imbalance in the
international investment regime.
The second reason appears to be the convenience of replicating text
and incorporating doctrine by following a charted path rather than
reinventing the wheel. This might ordinarily be called path-dependency.
But when China and India inherit the whole system, they (perhaps
Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Africa Committee of Experts,
35th mtg., Draft Pan-African Investment Code, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/35/18 (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstreamhandle/10855/23009/b11560526.pdf?sequence= 1. The Draft
Pan-African Investment Code is the subject of another article by this author to be published
subsequent o this Article.
264. See Sornarajah, supra note 44, at 136 (explaining voluntary host state invitations).
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unwittingly) do so with all of its historical baggage. To the extent the
system favors those on the upper-end of the hierarchy, China and India
have become accidental beneficiaries of the imbalance. However, as
China and India are still on the defensive side vis-a-vis their Northern
partners, as demonstrated in the more than twenty cases against India
discussed in Section II, the modifications they attempt to make to the
international investment regime, if successful, may ironically benefit
Africa.265
Thirdly, in this day and age, any attempt to use different models based
on the economic standing of the partner would not be politically
acceptable, not only because the African states would naturally resist a
different treatment, as they now have the capacity and the negotiating
power to do so, but also because Africa will likely have support from
bigger economies. A good demonstration of the latter point is the extreme
and immediate reaction of the major powers to any perceived misdeed by
Chinese companies operating in Africa.266
Finally, the complexities of modern life are redefining traditional
hierarchies in ways that will sooner or later render the fundamental
premises of international investment law more or less obsolete. Consider
this, for example:
The top 100 MNEs in UNCTAD's Transnationality Index have, on
average, more than 500 affiliates each, across more than 50 countries.
They have 7 hierarchical levels in their ownership structure (i.e.
ownership links to affiliates could potentially cross 6 borders), they
have about 20 holding companies owning affiliates across multiple
jurisdictions, and they have almost 70 entities in offshore investment
hubs.267
265. China and India could not be discussed in the same category in this regard, because China
has not made any significant changes to its most recent BIT model, and has never used differing
models on the basis of Northern and Southern economic status of its partners. Although India has
also never varied its BITs on the basis of the economic standing of its partners, its new model is
decidedly defensive; were it to become successful in implementing the new Model Text across the
board, African states, and indeed other less developed countries where Indian investors invest
would probably appreciate the defensive posturing. This appears to be a conscious and pragmatic
choice that India has made in rendering its new Model Text. Although many highly sophisticated
Indian companies invest substantial capital and resources in the developing world, including Africa,
India's Model Text offers evidence of India's greater concern over the treatment of foreign
investors in India rather than Indian investors abroad.
266. See, e.g., David Smith, Hillary Clinton Launches African Tour with a Veiled Attack on
China, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2012 12:46 PM)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/01/hillary-clinton-africa-china (illustrating African
support from larger economies and noting the United States' approach to dealing with China).
267. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2016: INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES xiii (2016),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir20l6_en.pdf.
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And indeed, "[m]ore than 40 percent of foreign affiliates worldwide
have multiple 'passports.' These affiliates are part of complex ownership
chains with multiple cross-border links involving on average three
jurisdictions. The nationality of investors in and owners of foreign
affiliates is becoming increasingly blurred." 268
International investment treaties are predicated on the simple
assumption that there is a host state bent on mistreating a foreign investor
who requires the protection of its home state, and the host state's legal
processes are either inferior or unfair. Even assuming that the need for
home state protection is a valid assumption in modem economic
relations, the traditional rules and institutions are increasingly less
adaptable to contemporary cross-border business transactions of the type
that the UNCTAD Report cited above describes. As indicated in Section
IV, a simple look at publicly available statistics suggests that there is
more African investment in India than Indian investment in Africa
because large amounts of investment from wealthy nations, including the
United States, are rerouted to India through Mauritius.
268. Id. at xii-xiii:
Multiple passport affiliates are the result of indirect foreign ownership, transit
investment through third countries, and round-tripping. About 30 per cent of foreign
affiliates are indirectly foreign owned through a domestic entity; more than 10 per cent
are owned through an intermediate entity in a third country; [and] about I per cent are
ultimately owned by a domestic entity. These types of affiliates are much more common
in the largest MNEs: 60 per cent of their foreign affiliates have multiple cross-border
ownership links to the parent company. . Rules on foreign ownership are ubiquitous:
80 per cent of countries restrict majority foreign ownership in at least one industry. The
trend in ownership-related measures is towards liberalization, through the lifting of
restrictions, increases in allowed foreign shareholdings, or easing of approvals and
admission procedures for foreign investors. However, many ownership restrictions
remain in place in both developing and developed countries. The blurring of investor
nationality has made the application of rules and regulations on foreign ownership more
challenging. Policymakers in some countries have developed a range of mechanisms to
safeguard the effectiveness of foreign ownership rules, including anti-dummy laws,
general anti-abuse rules to prevent foreign control, and disclosure requirements. Indirect
ownership structures and mailbox companies have the potential to significantly expand
the reach of flAs. About one third of ISDS claims are filed by claimant entities that are
ultimately owned by a parent in a third country (not party to the treaty on which the claim
is based). Some recent IlAs try to address the challenges posed by complex ownership
structures through more restrictive definitions, denial of benefits clauses and substantial
business activity requirements, but the vast majority of existing treaties does not have
such devices. Policymakers should be aware of the de facto multilateralizing effect of
complex ownership on IlAs. For example, up to a third of apparently intra-regional
foreign affiliates in major (prospective) megaregional treaty areas, such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),
and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), are ultimately owned
by parents outside the region, raising questions about the ultimate beneficiaries of these
treaties and negotiations.
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For all of these reasons, the attempt to redraft existing BIT texts, modify
substantive provisions, and reform ISDS processes may in some ways be
seeking an old solution to a new set of problems. China and India must
rethink old assumptions and models, and approach their growing
economic relations with Africa with a fresh set of ideas that take into
account their respective unique needs and the contemporary phenomenon
of multiple passports and borderless pluralism. That future might be a
future without investment treaties.
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